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Half a million people sit in jail every day in America who have not
been convicted of a crime but stand merely accused. Detention can cost
defendants their jobs, housing, or even custody of their children; deten-
tion makes defendants more likely to commit a crime and can harm them
mentally and physically; it takes a toll on defendants' families and com-
munities too. Courts simply ignore these serious harms when deciding
whether a defendant should lose her liberty because of a mere accusation
of wrongdoing. Yet in striking contrast o criminal cases, where the gov-
ernment so often succeeds in obtaining before trial the relief that it ulti-
mately seeks-incarceration of the defendant-civil plaintiffs attempting
to obtain before judgment he relief that they ultimately seek-by way of
a preliminary injunction-face quite a challenge. Civil plaintiffs cannot
obtain such prejudgment relief unless they demonstrate likelihood of ir-
reparable injury and that denying interim relief would be more harmful
to them than granting such relief would be to the defendant. This dispar-
ity between criminal pretrial detention and civil preliminary injunctions
is both troubling and illuminating. It is troubling that the law affords
more protection to the property interests of civil defendants than to the
liberty interests of criminal defendants who are purportedly presumed
innocent. But in this historical moment where pretrial detention and bail
systems are changing in many jurisdictions, the preliminary injunction
comparison offers a valuable lens through which to reconceptualize pre-
trial detention.
A more civil-like approach to pretrial detention would raise the
threshold of government interest necessary to justify detaining an
accused-not some minimal likelihood that the defendant might forget to
appear in court or be accused of some minor crime such as jaywalking.
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As in the civil system, criminal courts should not simply ignore the
immense costs to a defendant of ordering pretrial detention. Rather,
courts should consider those costs to defendants, their loved ones, and
the broader public and should detain defendants only when the benefits
outweigh those substantial costs. Finally, to detain a defendant, courts
should require that the government demonstrate likelihood of success on
the merits through evidence subject to the defendant's refutation. Such
additional process would increase costs on the front end but would
potentially lower the pretrial process costs overall by reducing rates of
pretrial detention, post-trial incarceration, and recidivism caused by
criminogenic jails and prisons.
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INTRODUCTION
On any given day in America, approximately half a million people sit in pre-
trial detention-imprisoned though not convicted of a crime. Those 500,000
people spend an average of one month in jail.2 Some spend years.3 And the
human consequences of pretrial detention are substantial. Lavette Mayes lost her
home, her thriving small business collapsed, and her children were traumatized
during the fourteen months that she spent in pretrial detention.4 David Jones lost
his job and apartment and missed his son's graduation while in pretrial detention
even though he was assessed as a low risk for failure to appear or be rearrested;
charges were dropped fourteen months later.5 Mustafa Willis lost his job and
missed his cousin's funeral while detained for months awaiting trial for a crime
he did not commit.6 George Peters lost his full-time job and custody of his two
children who were taken out of school and sent to live with their mother while
incarcerated for forty-three days until prosecutors dropped all charges against
him.7 Kalief Browder ended his life after many unsuccessful attempts on his life
1. ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JAL INMATES IN 2016, at 9 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/jil6.pdf (reporting that there were 458,600 unconvicted defendants in jail at the end of
2016); Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON POL'Y
INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html [https://perma.cc/
A9AG-HB7N] (noting that the United States's pretrial detainee population, which is "responsible for all
of the [country's] net jail growth" over the last two decades, totaled 536,000 in 2018); see also Jocelyn
Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 595 (2017) ("[H]undreds of thousands of
defendants across America, disproportionately people of color, wait in local jails for dispositions of their
cases, often held on $500 bail or less." (footnote omitted)).
2. SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAL IN
AMERICA'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 158 (2018).
3. See id. at 168 (providing an example of a defendant who was detained for more than two years
while "awaiting trial on bail of $250,000").
4. Teresa Wiltz, Locked Up: Is Cash Bail on the Way Out?, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Mar. 1, 2017),
http://pew.org/21WNodH [https://perma.cc/6JLQ-TL3Z]. She would have been detained even longer
were it not for the community bail fund. See id. ("After she had spent 14 months in the Cook County
Jail, the Chicago Community Bond Fund, a volunteer organization, helped Mayes make bail after a
judge reduced the amount."). See generally Simonson, supra note 1 (explaining bail funds' important
role in providing community voice).
5. Alysia Santo, Kentucky's Protracted Struggle to Get Rid of Bail, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 12,
2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/1 1/12/kentucky-s-protracted-struggle-to-get-rid-of-
bail [https://perma.cc/P2AB-2JUZ].
6. Keith Romer & Joel Rose, Episode 783: New Jersey Bails Out, NPR (July 12, 2017, 5:49 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2017/07/12/53690588 1/episode-783-new-jersey-bails-out [https://
perma.cc/T6WC-83RW].
7. PRETRIAL JUSTICE CLINIC, UNIV. OF BALT. SCH. OF LAW, YEAR-END REPORT: OUTCOMES,
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 (2017), http://home.ubalt.edu/id86mp66/PTJC/PTJC_YearEnd-
Report_June_2017.pdf. George Peters is a pseudonym. Id.
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made during and after the three years he spent in pretrial detention on Rikers
Island.' After being arrested on misdemeanor charges, Louis Fano slit his wrists
in the first few hours of his pretrial detention; Fano was sent to solitary confine-
ment for three months as a result and hanged himself in his cell two weeks later.9
These are just a few examples.
In the civil system, by contrast, courts are loath to award the plaintiff relief
before trial; civil defendants' property interests are too important to do that
lightly. 0 Indeed, the Supreme Court describes the preliminary injunction as "an
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief." 1 Preliminary injunction law imposes a high
"barrier against the easy use of public power without a trial."12
It might be natural to explain this disparity by suggesting that criminal courts
need to detain dangerous defendants. But that explanation does not wash.13 Bail
was historically meant to ensure defendants' appearance at trial, not to prevent
reoffending.14 And most pretrial detainees are detained not because a court has
deemed them too dangerous to grant them their liberty but because they cannot
afford bail." With a median pre-incarceration income of only $15,109 per year,
defendants are unsurprisingly unable to pay the median bail amount of $10,000-
two-thirds of their already-scant annual income.16 As the former U.S. Attorney
8. Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993-2015, NEW YORKER (June 7, 2015), http://www.
newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015 [https://perma.cc/XU4V-R29H].
9. Melissa Fares & Charles Levinson, In Louisiana Jail, Inmate Deaths Mount as Mental Health
Pleas Unheeded, REUTERS (May 31, 2018, 11:15 AM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-
report/usa-jails-louisiana/ [https://perma.cc/RT43-WXH6].
10. For simplicity, this Article refers to the party seeking a preliminary injunction as the "plaintiff'
and the party opposing it as the "defendant," although other permutations are possible.
11. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008); see also 11A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948, at 122 (3d ed. 2013) (describing "the
courts' general reluctance to impose an interim restraint on defendant before the parties' rights have
been adjudicated").
12. DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION
193 (3d ed. 2018).
13. See generally Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490 (2018) (arguing that
the bases for detaining accused defendants apply just as strongly to equally dangerous people who have
not been accused of a crime).
14. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 21; see also Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from
Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REV. 837, 864.
15. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS
IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 - STATISTICAL TABLES 15 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fdluc09.pdf (reporting that in 2009 only ten percent of defendants were detained due to outright
denial of bail and the remaining ninety percent were detained because they could not afford to pay their
bail); see also BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, DETAINING THE POOR:
How MONEY BAIL PERPETUATES AN ENDLESS CYCLE OF POVERTY AND JAIL TIME 1 fig.1 (2016), http://
www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/DetainingThePoor.pdf ("Nationally, in 2009, 34% of defendants were
detained pretrial for the inability to post money bail.").
Embedded in the frequently used term "pretrial release" is the problematic assumption that pretrial
detention is the usual condition. To the extent possible without causing confusion, this Article uses
"pretrial liberty" instead.
16. RABUY & KOPF, supra note 15, at 2-3 (using 2015 dollars); id. at 2 ("The median bail bond
amount in this country represents eight months of income for the typical detained defendant.").
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General put it, "When bail is set unreasonably high, people are behind bars only
because they are poor. Not because they're a danger or a flight risk-only
because they are poor."" Regulating pretrial detention by setting money bail
wastes money by incarcerating defendants who are not dangerous and jeopardizes
safety by allowing dangerous, wealthy defendants to secure their pretrial liberty
too easily.8
Pretrial detention regimes are in a great state of flux across the country, driven
primarily by advocates hoping to eliminate these ills.1 9 On the federal level,
Senators Rand Paul and Kamala Harris introduced bipartisan legislation meant o
spur further state reform by providing federal block grants.20 Several jurisdictions
are eliminating or curtailing money bail.21 Some jurisdictions now require judges
to consider the defendant's ability to pay when they set bail; 22 the Fifth Circuit
17. Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks at White House Convening on Incarceration and
Poverty (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-
remarks-white-house-convening-incarceration-and [https://perma.cc/FNL7-D238] [hereinafter Lynch
Remarks]; see also Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 434 (2016) ("The
majority of defendants awaiting trial in jail are detained because they could not afford the bail set for
them, not because they were found to be dangerous or have a particularly high flight risk.").
18. See, e.g., Gouldin, supra note 14, at 864 (explaining that "if a court views a defendant as being a
high risk for committing a new crime on release, it does not seem appropriate to simply set a high price
for release" because "[d]angerous defendants do not become less dangerous by paying bail").
19. See, e.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 181 ("There is a growing national consensus against
commercial bail, and a concomitant effort to eliminate money bail altogether."); CRIMINAL JUSTICE
POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAw SCH., MOVING BEYOND MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAL REFORM 30
(2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-on-Bail-Reform.pdf ("The country's approach
to the pretrial process is undergoing intensive reexamination and may be on the verge of fundamental
change. Money bail, nearly ubiquitous and deeply entrenched for decades, is now subject to scrutiny and
criticism from a broad array of observers and advocates.").
20. See Kamala D. Harris & Rand Paul, Opinion, Kamala Harris and Rand Paul: To Shrink Jails,
Let's Reform Bail, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/opinion/kamala-
harris-and-rand-paul-lets-reform-bail.html [https://nyti.ms/2tjr9kY] (discussing the authors' legislative
proposal, entitled the Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act).
21. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13; D.C. CODE § 23-1321(c)(1)(B)(xii)-(xiii) (2013); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 to -26 (West 2017); S.B. 10, 2017-
2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 7.3(b); N.M. CT. R. 6-401; see also Colin
Starger & Michael Bullock, Legitimacy, Authority, and the Right to Affordable Bail, 26 WM. & MARY
BLL RTS. J. 589, 602 (2018) ("Bail reform efforts have gathered serious momentum over the past year
as jurisdictions around the country have moved to limit or end money bail practices.").
For a summary of state and federal reform efforts, see generally BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 181-83,
and PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., WHERE PRETRIAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE HAPPENING (2017), https://higherlogic
download.s3.amazonaws.com/NCJA/c3320104-776e-4eOe-b687-4ffalfd54e8c/Uploadedlmages/National%
20Forum/2017%20Forum/fanno-burdeen-where-pretrial-improvements-2017.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Brangan v. Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949, 957 (Mass. 2017) ("Based on our review of
the applicable statute and relevant decisions, we are persuaded that a judge must consider a criminal
defendant's financial resources in setting bail."); People ex rel. Desgranges v. Anderson, 59 Misc. 3d 238,
241 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. 2018) ("It is clear to this court that a lack of consideration of a
defendant's ability to pay the bail being set at an arraignment is a violation of the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the New York State Constitution."); General
Order No. 18.8a, Procedures for Bail Hearings and Pretrial Release, CIR. CT. OF COOK COUNTY, ILL.
(2017), http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Portals/0/Onlers/General%200rder/2ONo.%2018.8a.pdf (requiring
judges to consider defendants' ability to pay bail and requiring judges who set bail to do so in an amount that
the defendant "has the present ability to pay" and requiring consideration of defendant's financial resources in
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has indicated that it would do the same.23 Several other legal challenges have also
proven successful.24 Some jurisdictions are increasingly employing citations
instead of custodial arrests to avoid pretrial detention entirely.25 Others also seem
poised for sweeping reforms.2 6
These reforms all far short in important ways. Scholarly treatment of bail has
been thoughtful and insightful, but it has largely focused on the two doctrinal
engines of bail analysis: "flight risk" and "dangerousness."27
deternining bail amounts, which must not be "oppressive" in light of the availability of such resources);
Richard A. Oppel Jr., Defendants Can't Be Jailed Solely Because of Inability to Post Bail, Judge Says, N.Y.
TIMES (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/us/chicago-bail-refoin.html?mwrsm=Email&_
r-0 [https://nyti.ms/2utqQYE] (explaining that for "judges in Chicago ... it will no longer be possible to set
bail so high that people do not have enough money to pay for their release, which could mean they remain in
jail for months or even years before a trial, a plea bargain or a dismissal").
23. See ODonnell v. Harris County, 882 F.3d 528, 535, 541 (5th Cir. 2018) (affirming the grant of a
preliminary injunction and holding that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed in demonstrating that
Houston's bail system unconstitutionally discriminates against the poor).
24. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 167-77 (detailing the various constitutional challenges to bail
laws and practices around the country).
25. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 21, at 1-2; see also Adam M. Gershowitz, Justice on the
Line: Prosecutorial Screening Before Arrest, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing for
prosecutor involvement in the decision to make a warrantless arrest to reduce the number of arrests that
lead to dismissals); Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307 (2017) (arguing that far
fewer defendants should be custodially arrested).
26. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, When Bail Is Out ofDefendant's Reach, Other Costs Mount, N.Y. TIMES
(June 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/us/when-bail-is-out-of-defendants-reach-other-
costs-mount.html [https://nyti.ms/1S3FkkG] (discussing recent local, state, and federal moves toward
bail reform); James C. McKinley Jr., Cuomo, in Bid to Help Poor, Proposes Ending Cash Bailfor Minor
Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/nyregion/cuomo-ending-
cash-bail-state-of-the-state.html [https://nyti.ms/2EHUoEc] ("Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo plans to ask the
New York State Legislature to eliminate cash bail for many crimes and to speed up the disclosure of
evidence in trials as part of a package of proposals intended [to] make the criminal justice system fairer
for indigent defendants, his aides said.").
27. See generally Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723
(2011) (contending that considering the likelihood of reoffending as a basis for pretrial detention
violates the presumption of innocence); Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677
(2018) (arguing that courts have used "flight risk" too broadly, sweeping in not only defendants actually
absconding from the jurisdiction but also defendants who simply forget about their court dates);
Gouldin, supra note 14, at 837 (discussing the often-overlooked "conflation (by judges and in statutes)
of flight risk and danger"); Mayson, supra note 13 (considering the theoretical justification for
preconviction detention based on dangerousness).
For recent analysis of the shortcomings of this two-part test, see generally Simonson, supra note 1,
and Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399 (2017). For a
multifaceted look at the many problems in America's pretrial detention system, see BAUGHMAN, supra
note 2.
Both of these terms are misleading: the term "flight risk" is used to evaluate the likelihood that a
defendant may fail to appear for any reason rather than that a defendant will "flee a jurisdiction,"
Gouldin, supra, at 683; "dangerousness" is used to mean merely the risk that the defendant will be
accused of a future crime and not that a defendant poses a danger to anyone, Simonson, supra note 1, at
613-14 (discussing contemporary definitions of "dangerousness" in pretrial detention inquiries). To
avoid these misleading impressions, this Article refers to the current standards as "risk of
nonappearance" and "risk of rearrest."
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This Article wades into an active discussion in the popular press28 and amongst
legal scholars29 about pretrial detention and bail reform. It fundamentally rethinks
pretrial detention by contrasting it with a theoretically parallel procedure in the
civil system-the preliminary injunction.30 In the civil system, preliminary
injunction standards seek "to minimize the probable irreparable loss of rights
caused by errors incident to hasty decision" that must be made before the court
can resolve a case on its merits.31 Preliminary injunctions minimize irreparable
damage by balancing the harms that granting or denying the relief might impose
on either side and considering the interests of nonparties. In some ways, criminal
pretrial detention also seeks to minimize harm between case filing and disposi-
tion. This objective has become even more prominent since criminal law began
allowing courts to consider the likelihood that the defendant will commit a crime
while enjoying pretrial liberty to justify detaining a defendant or setting bail.3 2
But criminal law doctrine, by contrast, takes a one-sided approach to the in-
terim-harm analysis. It considers only how the defendant's freedom could harm
the public and overlooks the ways that pretrial detention harms the defendant, her
loved ones, and the broader public. Indeed, defendants' relatives are so thor-
oughly overlooked that children whose parents are jailed may be left to fend for
themselves.3 3 As with preliminary injunctions, criminal law too should consider
the harm that awarding interim relief to the government-detaining a defendant
pretrial-inflicts on the other side and on nonparties. Moreover, just as the civil
system recognizes the extraordinary nature of depriving defendants of their prop-
erty before judgment, at least the same degree of hesitation is warranted before
depriving accused defendants of their liberty. Liberty interests are at least as
28. E.g., Shawn Carter, Jay Z: For Father's Day, I'm Taking On the Exploitative Bail Industry, TIME
(June 16, 2017), http://time.com/4821547/jay-z-racism-bail-bonds/ [https://perma.cc/PUW6-H9GE];
Keith Humphreys, We're Jailing Way More People Who've Been Convicted of Exactly Nothing, WASH.
PosT (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/04/24/were-jailing-way-
more-people-whove-been-convicted-of-exactly-nothing/?utmterm=.e111e4baclb6 [https://perma.cc/
U7P2-2LEW].
29. E.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2; Gouldin, supra note 27; Gouldin, supra note 14; Mayson, supra
note 13; Simonson, supra note 1.
30. This is an exercise in domestic comparative procedure. See David A. Sklansky & Stephen C.
Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal
Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 683-84 (2006) (arguing for the importance of conducting
"comparative work in civil and criminal procedure," or "regularly contrasting American civil and
criminal procedure with each other" as an overlooked but potentially "illuminating" area of research
that could "provid[e] a more stable base for reform"). There is now a burgeoning such literature. See
infra Part I.
31. John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARv. L. REv. 525, 540-41
(1978).
32. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 18-27 (explaining the historical development of courts
considering a defendant's potential future crime as a basis for pretrial detention).
33. See, e.g., Cary Aspinwall, Overlooked: As Women Go to Jail in Record Numbers, Who's
Watching Out for Their Kids? No One, DALL. NEWS (June 22, 2017), https://interactives.dallasnews.
com/2017/overlooked/ [https://perma.cc/5VU2-GWYU] ("For nearly a month, [twelve-year-old] Kylia
and her two young sisters lived alone in a rented house in Arlington. No one involved in jailing their
mother - not the police, not the courts, not the sheriff's department - ever checked on them.").
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important as property interests, and pretrial detention will heavily influence a
case's outcome on the merits.
To minimize interim harm and recognize the extraordinary nature of affording
one party the relief she seeks before judgment, the preliminary injunction stand-
ard: (1) requires that the plaintiff demonstrate likely irreparable harm in the ab-
sence of an injunction to warrant such an extraordinary remedy, (2) balances the
interests of both sides surrounding this interim relief and the interests of nonpar-
ties, and (3) considers who is likely to ultimately succeed on the merits based on
evidentiary submissions.3 4 Deciding whether a defendant should be detained
before trial should similarly first require the government to show a likelihood of
irreparable injury to the public if the defendant were granted her liberty. If the
government can make such a showing, pretrial detention should turn on whether
the likely harm to the public of granting the defendant liberty outweighs the likely
harm of detention to the defendant, her loved ones, and the public. And as with
preliminary injunctions, the government should have to demonstrate likelihood
of success on the merits by relying on evidence that the defendant can contest;
defendants should be afforded discovery to meaningfully contest this evidence.35
Such an approach would heighten the government's burden from the status
quo: when it seeks to detain an accused, the government would have to prove that
the defendant's pretrial liberty will likely inflict irreparable harm to the public;
the possibility that a defendant might be rearrested for a minor crime or miss a
court date because of a work conflict would not suffice. Once the government sat-
isfies that irreparable harm standard, defendants would be detained pretrial only
when the benefits of detention outweigh its costs-an analysis that is strikingly
incomplete in the current doctrine. Maybe Lavette Mayes, David Jones, Mustafa
Willis, and many others should lose their homes, businesses, and miss important
family events because of a pending charge. But they and theirs should be forced
to bear those substantial costs only if the public interest in detaining them out-
weighs those costs and not merely because the law ignores them.3 6
34. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
35. The likelihood of success inquiry need not occur simultaneously with the interest-balancing
inquiry so long as both precede the decision to detain.
The argument in this Article is framed as one that legislatures should employ through statute or courts
through rule changes. However, a similar claim could be framed as a procedural due process argument,
and a more robust reading of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail Clause could solve some of
pretrial detention's ills. See, e.g., Gouldin, supra note 27, at 696-701 (explaining the historical origins of
the Excessive Bail Clause and a modem doctrinal hook for reading it more broadly than lower courts
have done); Gouldin, supra note 14, at 871-72 (explaining the potential import of United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) for excessive bail arguments).
36. See Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2017)
(arguing that the cost of detaining many defendants who are now detained exceeds the benefit and that a
better policy could have saved $78 billion over the past decade); Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos
Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L. REV. 187, 202, 214 (2017) (proposing "[i]ncorporating
cost-benefit analysis more directly into statutory bail reform"); Yang, supra note 27, at 1469-70
(explaining "the [overlooked] social costs" of pretrial detention).
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Borrowing from preliminary injunction law makes sense because pretrial
detention shares important similarities with preliminary injunctions that scholars
have not yet recognized. In short, both analyses resolve the question of what to do
with the parties' rights before the merits can be adjudicated and allow the party
initiating the case to obtain the relief it seeks before the court rules on the merits.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the bases for comparing
preliminary injunctions and pretrial detention. Part II addresses the xisting dis-
parities in procedure and substance between the two systems. Part III then re-
envisions a pretrial detention schema based on preliminary injunction law and
explains why such a regime would be better than what we have now.
I. EXPLAINING THE COMPARISON
Civil and criminal procedure share important similarities that often make com-
paring them especially productive:
They are both, after all, systems of adjudicating-or otherwise resolving-dis-
putes, and settling-or sidestepping-disagreements about historical facts.
They both aim at fairness, accuracy, and efficiency-albeit in different mix-
tures. They share similar stages: pleading, discovery, trial or settlement, and
appeal. They share the institution of the jury. They both have rules designed to
protect the finality of judgments.3
Indeed, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were initially drafted to closely
track the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 8 Scholarship in comparative civil and
criminal procedure now exists, at varying levels of detail, on: settlement and
methods of facilitating consensual resolution of cases;3 9 pleading standards and
motions to dismiss;4 investigation and discovery;4 1 summary judgment and its
37. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 30, at 684.
38. See Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal Procedure Are So Different: A Forgotten History, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 698 (2017) (describing the "[c]onfidential and never publicly circulated" first
draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as having "integrated the rules of civil procedure," a
"conception" that was ultimately discarded).
39. See Russell M. Gold, "Clientless" Prosecutors, 51 GA. L. REV. 693, 709-21 (2017) (comparing
the judicial role regarding consensual resolutions in class action law and with respect to plea agreements
in criminal law); Russell M. Gold, Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Civilizing Criminal
Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607 (2017) (borrowing from civil procedure's settlement system in
considering how criminal procedure might better facilitate guilty pleas); Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note
30, at 696-705 (considering judges' role in facilitating and approving consensual resolutions in both
systems).
40. See Gold, Hessick & Hessick, supra note 39, at 1640-45 (arguing that criminal systems should
heighten pleading standards and make motions to dismiss more robust more like what civil systems do).
41. See, e.g., id. at 1645-48 (suggesting more liberal discovery rules for criminal cases); Ion Meyn,
Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091 (2014)
(illustrating the factual deficit inherent in the criminal discovery system through comparison to the civil
discovery system); Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 30, at 713-18 (contrasting discovery and
investigation between civil and criminal procedure and discussing how criminal and civil discovery
systems might borrow more from each other); Jenia I. Turner, Managing Digital Discovery in Criminal
Cases, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2019) (exploring criminal law e-discovery in part
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lack of criminal counterpart;4 prior adjudication, such as preclusion and double
jeopardy;4 3 remedies for process failures and concerns about finality;44 concep-
tions of pretrial procedural due process;45 preliminary hearings and preliminary
injunctions;46  and greater accountability for prosecutors and class
counsel.4 7 One seemingly insurmountable difference between civil and criminal
procedure is the divide between public and private law. But criminal law is not
purely public law, nor is civil litigation purely private.48
This Article draws a new comparison between civil and criminal procedure-
one involving interim relief. More specifically, it compares civil preliminary
injunctions with criminal pretrial detention to consider what criminal procedure
can learn from its civil counterpart. Both processes address the question of what
to do with the parties' interests prior to adjudication, including when to allow the
party initiating the case to obtain some measure of the relief that it ultimately
seeks without first proving its case on the merits.49 Or put differently, both inqui-
ries operate with a similar goal and at similar stages of their respective
procedures.o
Moreover, in the pretrial phase criminal procedure's objectives most closely
resemble civil procedure's. Pretrial detention and bail seek to protect the court's
through comparison to civil e-discovery standards); Daniel S. McConkie, Civilizing Criminal Discovery
1 (Sept. 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing for "the civilization of
criminal discovery" through the creation of a criminal "discovery phase").
42. See Gold, Hessick & Hessick, supra note 39, at 1648-51 (arguing that criminal systems should
adopt a process akin to summary judgment).
43. See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 30, at 705-13 (comparing former adjudication in the
criminal and civil systems).
44. See id. at 718-27 (analyzing the civil and criminal systems' differing reactions to and remedies
for failed process); William B. Rubenstein, Finality in Class Action Litigation: Lessons from Habeas, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 790 (2007) (considering what class action law can learn from habeas law about
addressing finality concerns).
45. See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 2
(2006) (discussing "an anomalous divergence between civil and criminal due process rules"); Ion Meyn,
The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39 (2014) (explaining that civil
defendants have greater pretrial due process protections than do criminal defendants).
46. See Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing
Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 518-19 (1986) (making passing reference to the
comparison); Kuckes, supra note 45, at 24 & n.132 (same).
47. See Russell M. Gold, "Clientless" Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87 (2017) (drawing on
prosecutor-accountability literature to consider ways to improve the accountability of class counsel);
Gold, supra note 39 (considering how class action accountability mechanisms could improve prosecutor
accountability).
48. See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 30, at 701-02 (suggesting strains of public and private law in
both criminal and civil law); see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984)
(arguing that "the purpose of adjudication" is not merely private dispute resolution because it "uses
public resources, and employs . . . public officials" whose "job is not to maximize the ends of private
parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in
authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes"); Gold, supra note 47, at 99-100 (highlighting
important similarities between civil class actions and criminal prosecutions, including in their public-
and private-law objectives).
49. In the federal system, see FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)-(g) (2012).
50. See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 30, at 684 (explaining procedural parallels between civil and
criminal process).
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ability to effectuate a judgment and prevent the defendant from committing fur-
ther harm while the case is pending." Although deterrence and retribution can do
significant postjudgment work in criminal law as punishment principles,52 they
should have no meaningful role in pretrial process. After all, pretrial detention is
not considered punishment.53 Rather, judicial efficacy and incapacitation should
drive criminal pretrial decisionmaking.54 Much as the criminal system seeks to
prevent the defendant from absconding, preliminary injunctions may issue if the
plaintiff demonstrates "a strong indication" that the defendant will become insol-
vent before a judgment can be collected;" both bases seek to ensure the integrity
of judicial process. Moreover, that preliminary injunctions should not issue unless
necessary to prevent the plaintiff from likely being irreparably injured somewhat
parallels the notion that pretrial detention seeks to prevent the defendant from
violating the law while the case is pending.56 Indeed, the similarities between the
two mechanisms increased when preventing a defendant's potential criminal con-
duct during the pendency of a case became a permissible reason to detain
pretrial.
Pretrial detention and preliminary injunctions share other important similar-
ities. Whether a claimant obtains a preliminary injunction or the government suc-
ceeds in detaining the defendant pretrial are typically of great practical import
and substantially affect the outcome of cases. Moreover, sometimes the
51. See Gouldin, supra note 14, at 845-48 (recounting the development of the contemporary purpose
of pretrial detention).
52. See, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1143-49
(2013) (explaining the role that proportionality and intentional infliction of punishment play in
retributivist punishment heory and explaining that granting convicted defendants credit for time served
pretrial undermines proportionality).
Deterrence is also an important objective in American civil procedure because private enforcement
supplements the limited resources of its public counterpart. See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant
Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 285, 285 (2016) (explaining the benefits of redundant
public and private enforcement); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function
of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 721 (1941) (explaining the necessity of private enforcement o
supplement he limited resources of public enforcement).
53. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-48 (1987); see also Kolber, supra note 52, at 1144
("Many theorists [explain] that punishment must generally be intended as such.").
54. See, e.g., Gouldin, supra note 14, at 844-52.
55. Micro Signal Research, Inc. v. Otus, 417 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 2005); see, e.g., 11A WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 11, § 2948.1, at 136-38 ("[A] risk that the defendant will become insolvent before a
judgment can be collected[] may give rise to the irreparable harm necessary for a preliminary
injunction." (footnote omitted)).
56. A more detailed comparison reveals that criminal law's pretrial detention standard is far less
stringent in its requisite showing of harm than is the civil preliminary injunction standard-a divergence
that features prominently in the discussion that follows. See infra Section II.B.
57. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 24-27 (explaining the historical development of the doctrine);
see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747-52 (countenancing pretrial detention as a permissible means of
preventing future crime).
58. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 33 (2008) (explaining that preliminary
injunctions may be "the whole ball game"); Simonson, supra note 1, at 589 (explaining that "[flor most
indigent defendants, bail is the ballgame"); see also Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The
Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly
Assigned Judges, 108 AM. EcON. REV. 201 (2018) (demonstrating empirically that pretrial detention
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preliminary injunction is, as a practical matter, all that the parties seek because
the time horizon of the dispute is short.59 Consider, for instance, the litigation
challenging the first two versions of the executive order banning travel to the
United States from several majority-Muslim countries.6 The Supreme Court
could not even reach whether the ban should be preliminarily enjoined because
the ban had expired on its own terms, mooting the controversy.61
Civil and criminal procedure are somewhat different, and a few of these differ-
ences bear on the interim-relief comparison. Most of their differences suggest
that any disparity between preliminary injunctions and pretrial detention should
provide more protection to criminal than to civil defendants.62 First, and most
obviously, criminal defendants lose their liberty (and often their property too)
when they are restrained, whereas civil defendants lose, at most, only a property
right. Liberty interests are so important that any disparity between the two sys-
tems should mean that incarceration were more hesitatingly deployed than any
civil process affecting property rights.6 3 Second, the typical civil defendant is bet-
ter resourced than its adversary, but the typical criminal defendant is vastly out-
resourced by the government.64 A disparity should not cut against the criminal
defendant, whom our system ostensibly presumes innocent,6 5 nor should it treat
out-resourced criminal defendants less favorably than their well-resourced civil
counterparts. Third, at the time the movant seeks interim relief, prosecutors have
better access to evidence because of their relationship with the police and its evi-
dence-gathering apparatus than do civil plaintiffs that must depend on discovery
leads to adverse case outcomes); Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream
Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711 (2017) (same).
59. Mary J. Davis, Summary Adjudication Methods in United States Civil Procedure, 46 Am. J.
COmP. L. 229,242 n.56 (1998).
60. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017).
61. Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.), vacating as moot 857 F.3d 554
(4th Cir.).
62. Cf Gold, Hessick & Hessick, supra note 39 (arguing that criminal law should level up procedural
protections to be at least on par with civil systems).
63. See Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 2019 (2005) (criticizing the "hypocrisy of a society that provides greater
protection for the deprivation of property than for the seizure of people" in the context of pretrial
detention and Takings law).
I take no position on whether preliminary injunctions are too difficult to obtain or whether there is too
much process in at least some contexts where the property rights at stake are relatively insignificant.
Such cases would be a far cry from criminal cases where detention is quite consequential to the outcome
of the case and to the defendant's life.
64. See Gold, supra note 47, at 123-24. In some preliminary injunction litigation, such as patent
infringement cases, well-resourced plaintiffs may be more likely than in other civil litigation. See, e.g.,
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Ranir, LLC, No. 1: 17-cv-00185-TSB, 2017
WL 4392008 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2017), ECF No. 8.
65. E.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) ("Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the
presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning."); United
States v. Barber, 140 U.S. 164, 167 (1891) ("But in criminal cases it is for the interest of the public as
well as the accused that the latter should not be detained in custody prior to his trial .... Presumptively
they are innocent of the crime charged, and entitled to their constitutional privilege of being admitted to
bail.. . .").
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during the litigation to gather the evidence that they need.66 Fourth, prosecutors'
ethical obligations require them "to respect defendants' rights and embody [their]
constituents' preferences," rather than be purely adversarial.67 Finally, the one
difference that does not suggest more procedural protection in criminal law is
that the vast majority of criminal cases call on judges to decide whether to detain
the defendant before trial, whereas a comparatively small portion of the civil
caseload involves motions for a preliminary injunction.68
That the prosecutor is a public official, unlike a plaintiff's lawyer, may suggest
that greater judicial deference is due to the prosecutor's view of whether to
impose an interim restraint. But criminal law should not place too much trust in
even the most well-meaning prosecutors because "they must fly solo and fly
blind" without information about broader case-processing trends and without
meaningful input from their communities.6 9 Indeed, the very existence of com-
munity bail funds that enable strangers from the community to contribute money
to secure a defendant's pretrial liberty suggests that prosecutors are seeking and
successfully obtaining pretrial detention in cases where detention does not
advance the interests of the public-the prosecutor's client.70 In the civil
context, courts do not defer to government lawyers with regard to preliminary
injunctions even at the part of the doctrine where such deference would make the
most sense-determining whether an injunction would serve the public's inter-
est.7 1 There is no reason to treat government lawyers differently in this regard in
criminal procedure.7 2
66. See Meyn, supra note 41, at 1124 (explaining that "[t]he State's formal discovery tools are in
some instances more robust than tools afforded to civil litigants" because the state can conduct physical
searches and seize property); see also Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-in Effect of Preliminary Injunctions, 66
FLA. L. REV. 779, 800 (2014) ("Plaintiffs often seek preliminary injunctions before discovery can be
completed or even commenced, meaning that plaintiffs may not have the proof to show they can win,
even where such proof exists.").
67. Gold, supra note 39, at 706. For the normative side of this debate, compare Eric S. Fish, Against
Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1419 (2018) (arguing against the normative value of an
adversarial role for prosecutors), with Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2016) (exploring the potential benefits of a system in which prosecutors are more
purely adversarial than they are under existing ethical rules).
68. Preliminary injunctions are atypical in cases seeking only damages because pr judgment interest
awarded after a judgment can account for any harm in the interim period so long as there are no concerns
about the defendant's solvency. See 11 A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 2948.1, at 136-38.
69. Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutor Institutions and Incentives, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 49, 50 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), http://academyforjustice.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/10/Reforming-Criminal-JusticeVol_3.pdf.
70. Simonson, supra note 1, at 599-621.
71. In limited circumstances, courts defer to government expert witnesses. See, e.g., Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24-25 (2008) (relying on military expert testimony about the
national security implications of the case for purposes of a preliminary injunction). But see Sierra Forest
Legacy v. Sherman, 646 F.3d 1161, 1186 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the district court erred by
deferring to the government's forestry expert witnesses when ruling on a permanent injunction).
72. The quantity disparity between preliminary injunctions and pretrial detention-unlike many of
the differences discussed-could suggest the need for somewhat less extensive pretrial detention
process than for preliminary injunctions. This concern is addressed further below. See infra Section
III.B.
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The existence of a disparity between the two systems' approaches does not
indicate which way-if at all-the disparity should be eliminated. This Article
suggests that criminal procedure should look more like its civil counterpart in its
balanced and cautious approach to interim relief73 but takes no position on the
optimality of the preliminary injunction standard for the civil system. Pretrial
detention substantially and detrimentally affects defendants' lives and chances of
prevailing on the merits of their cases, and it also costs taxpayer money.74
Limiting use of pretrial detention to cases in which it is both necessary to avoid
the likelihood of serious harm and more beneficial than costly is a worthwhile
endeavor. And this is to say nothing of the potential monetary savings that
reduced detention costs could yield.75 Before taking up the lessons that civil pro-
cedure can offer to criminal procedure, Part II describes the procedural and sub-
stantive differences between the two regimes as they now exist.
II. EXISTING STANDARDS FOR INTERIM RELIEF
Although both pretrial detention and preliminary injunctions seek to resolve
the same question of what happens to the parties' rights as the case progresses,
their substantive standards and the procedures by which courts decide these ques-
tions differ greatly. Section II.A explains the procedural disparities. In short,
motions for preliminary injunctions are resolved based on written briefing sup-
ported by sometimes-extensive evidentiary submissions and after often-lengthy
hearings. Pretrial detention decisions, by contrast, churn through the criminal
legal system at breakneck speed-affording defendants only a matter of minutes
to explain why they should be permitted to enjoy their freedom pending trial.
Factual disputes are "resolved" without evidence.
Section II.B considers the disparate substantive standards between preliminary
injunctions and pretrial detention. In short, a preliminary injunction should not
issue unless the plaintiff demonstrates a likelihood that she will suffer irreparable
injury without interim relief-a stringent threshold designed to preserve the
extraordinary nature of such relief. And even then, courts balance all relevant
73. See generally Gold, Hessick & Hessick, supra note 39 (suggesting leveling up criminal
procedure to match civil procedure). Recent criminal law scholarship has argued for ratcheting up
protections to address disparities. See, e.g., Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1197,
1202 (2016) (suggesting leveling up protections for all suspects to match those afforded to police
suspects); Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 378 (2017) (suggesting that
dismissals in furtherance of justice might shed light on ways to increase justice for all).
Indeed, simply leveling up criminal law to look more like civil procedure may not go far enough. The
differences between the two systems-including liberty versus property-suggest hat criminal law
should be more protective of defendants' rights to avoid interim harm. But considering whether and how
criminal law could be more protective than civil procedure of defendants' rights to avoid interim
restraint is beyond the scope of this Article.
74. Cf. Roberts, supra note 73, at 341, 372-73 (recounting cases in which judges dismissed in
furtherance of justice in part due to taxpayer expense and "cost-benefit analysis"). This Article briefly
considers why the existing disparity exists. See infra text accompanying notes 198-203.
75. For more on the potential monetary savings of additional process, see infra Part III.
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interests, including the harm the injunction might impose on the defendant during
the pendency of the case before infringing on that defendant's property rights. By
contrast, criminal law considers only the harms that releasing the defendant might
inflict and not how harmful detention may be to the defendant, her loved ones,
and the public more broadly. Moreover, criminal law does not impose a stringent
threshold such as irreparable injury before depriving defendants of their liberty as
their cases progress but looks instead for some unquantified prospect that the de-
fendant might be accused of a crime while on pretrial liberty or not appear for
later court dates.
A. PROCEDURAL COMPARISON
Procedural protections for defendants differ substantially between criminal
pretrial detention and preliminary injunctions.7 In some large jurisdictions, pre-
trial detention decisions are often made incredibly quickly, via videoconference,
and without written briefing or counsel. Factual disputes may be "resolved" by
the government's lawyer proffering what she will prove later. In the civil system,
by contrast, a preliminary injunction will issue only after written briefing sup-
ported by sworn evidence and an often-extensive hearing. Let us take up this pro-
cedural distinction in more detail by considering each system in turn below.
1. Criminal
Initial pretrial detention hearings (or bail hearings, as they are often known)
can be shockingly brief." In Houston, for example, "some hearings last[] approx-
imately a minute."7 8 "Defendants are taken to a conferencing facility within the
jail and participate in the hearing by speaking to a split video screen that shows a
76. There is not one civil or criminal system in the United States, and the comparison in the pages
that follow accounts for differences across jurisdictions' criminal systems to the extent feasible. Cf. Sara
Mayeux, The Idea of "The Criminal Justice System," 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 56-57 (2018) (explaining
that the phrase "criminal justice system" misleadingly suggests procedural or substantive unity). On the
civil side, the differences in how preliminary injunctions are handled across state civil systems is
minimal for purposes relevant here. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. 1968)
(reciting a standard similar to the federal one); Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunction Standards in
Massachusetts State and Federal Courts, 35 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 7 (2013) (explaining similarities
between preliminary injunction standard in Massachusetts federal court and in many Massachusetts state
court cases).
For simplicity, this Article thus uses the federal civil standard as its basis for comparison; it provides
an effective basis for restructuring criminal systems even in states that might approach preliminary
injunctions slightly differently.
77. See, e.g., Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in 3 REFORMING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 69, at 21, 32 ("Currently, bail hearings in many jurisdictions are
shockingly short: only a few minutes per case."); cf. Curtis E.A. Kamow, Setting Bailfor Public Safety,
13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 1 (2008) (describing California bail hearings as "brief"). The lack of
procedure in many criminal courts for this initial bail determination may violate due process. See
Brangan v. Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949, 961-67 (Mass. 2017) (reversing a bail order on procedural
due process grounds).
78. Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 58, at 730.
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prosecutor and the magistrate handling the hearing."79 Defendants have no right
to counsel, and few can afford to retain counsel.0
A 2001 article depicts the system in Baltimore where incarcerated defendants
had no counsel for a month or longer even though an overwhelming majority
faced nonviolent charges, many of them misdemeanors.1 Their bail was set by a
commissioner who spoke to the defendants through a speaker system in a plexi-
glass wall in meetings that were open to the public in only the most technical
sense.82
Houston and Baltimore are not outliers. A recent study found that only about
half of U.S. jurisdictions provided defendants with counsel at pretrial detention
hearings,83 and even that number is misleadingly high; many of the largest juris-
dictions do not afford defendants counsel at pretrial detention hearings.84 As of
2009, fifty-seven percent of jurisdictions conducted their pretrial detention hear-
ings via videoconference rather than having the defendant physically present in a
courtroom and able to make eye contact with the judge." In Chicago, hearings of-
ten last less than two minutes.86 North Dakota's hearings last three minutes.87
Although the government has a coercive evidence-gathering apparatus and or-
dinarily collects a good deal of evidence before charges are even filed," the gov-
ernment need not introduce swom declarations or other evidence.89 A lawyer's
79. Id.; see also Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 77, at 25 (describing pretrial detention hearings via
videoconference).
80. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 7; see Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 58, at 730. So too
may counsel be constitutionally required. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 115-16.
81. Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter?: The Empirical and Legal Case for the
Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1728-37 (2002).
82. See id. at 1733 & n.61 (explaining that although there was a room in the jail where these
proceedings could be viewed on a televised broadcast there were no posted signs so indicating).
83. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., 2009 SURVEY OF PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 45 (2009), https://university.
pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=77d36182-26c4-ec2c-
ab29-c4c729cl2033&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/6CWJ-2XR9]; see also Douglas L. Colbert,
Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 386 (2011) ("[A]bout half of the
country's local jurisdictions persist in not providing counsel."); Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra
note 58, at 773-74 (explaining that only ten states provide all defendants with counsel at their first
appearance, whereas thirty do so in only some counties, and ten do not provide counsel for first
appearance in any county).
84. See, e.g., Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 58 (Houston); Megan T. Stevenson,
Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes, 34 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 511,
514 (2018) (Philadelphia).
85. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 83, at 45.
86. Injustice Watch Staff, Unequal Treatment: A Series: Bent on Bail, INJUSTICE WATCH (Oct. 14,
2016), http://injusticewatch.org/interactives/bent-on-bail [https://perma.cc/FJF2-CBF9].
87. Length of a Bail Hearing in North Dakota: 3 Minutes, NAT'L CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT
FORDHAM L. SCH. (Jan. 25, 2013), http://ncforaj.org/2013/01/25/length-of-a-bail-hearing-in-north-
dakota-3-minutes [https://perma.cc/2BP6-QHHQ].
88. Indeed, filing charges without evidence would violate prosecutors' ethical obligations to charge
crimes only when supported by probable cause. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR
Ass'N 2004).
89. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 1; Kuckes, supra note 45, at 24 n.129. There is ample federal case
law demonstrating this point. See, e.g., United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 321 n.7 (2d Cir.
2004) ("Most [bail hearings] proceed on proffers."); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203,
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representations-known as a "proffer"-typically suffice, including when courts
consider the "weight of the evidence" against the defendant to determine whether
to detain her.90 The defendant may be afforded an opportunity to rebut that prof-
fer,91 but she typically has, at best, a limited right to discovery at that early stage
of the proceeding to enable her to do so.9 2 The marked exception is New Jersey
where promising recent reforms afford defendants broader rights to predetention-
hearing discovery.93
Defendants can later ask the court o revise its detention or bail determination,
but even that process comes after defendants have spent more time in jail. And as
with the initial bail determinations, a proffer by the government lawyer typically
continues to suffice.94 Just getting a hearing to revisit the bail decision may take
weeks or months.95
These bail revision motions are far from uniform across jurisdictions, and in-
formation about the extent of written briefing that typically supports such a
motion in each state trial court is difficult to obtain without extensive qualitative
study. But I have gathered what I can through internet research.96 A New York
treatise suggests that judges can increase bail without holding a hearing or taking
evidence.97 In Baltimore, defendants have a "bail review hearing" even without
so requesting, but such a hearing consists only of a judge videoconferencing with
twenty-five defendants sitting in a classroom in the jail.98
206 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Often the opposing parties simply describe to the judicial officer the nature of
their evidence; they do not actually produce it."); United States v. Little, 235 F. Supp. 3d 272, 274-76
(D.D.C. 2017) (relying on the government's proffer to evaluate the weight of evidence). The ABA
Criminal Justice Standards too "do[] not contemplate a formal evidentiary proceeding" but rather
provide that the parties "may proceed by proffer." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL
RELEASE § 10-5.10(a) cmt. (AM. BAR Ass'N, 3d ed. 2007).
90. See supra note 89; see also Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and
Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REv. 335, 408 (1990) (arguing that prosecutors should not be permitted to
proceed by proffer but rather should have to call witnesses subject to confrontation).
91. See, e.g., United States v. LaFontaine, 210 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming the district
court's denial of the defendant's request to call a witness whose testimony supported the government
proffer but indicating that the defendant did call some witnesses); Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d at 206
("[B]ail hearings [are] typically informal affairs, not substitutes for trial or even for discovery . . . .").
92. See Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 43 (2015); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(b) (2012) (providing that the government must produce witness statements only after the witness has
testified on direct examination).
93. See State v. Robinson, 160 A.3d 1, 10 (N.J. 2017) (explaining that the New Jersey Rule
"guarantees far broader discovery than federal law does"); N.J. CT. R. 3:4-2(c)(2) (West 2018)
(providing that prosecutors "seeking pretrial detention" must provide to the defendant with discovery at
least twenty-four hours before a detention hearing including "all statements or reports relating to the
affidavit of probable cause," "all statements or reports relating to additional evidence the State relies on
to establish probable cause at the hearing," and " all exculpatory evidence").
94. See supra note 89 (listing federal precedent in support of this point). At least one state decision
suggests an evidence-taking approach, however. See State v. Blow, 135 A.3d 672, 675 (Vt. 2015)
(affirming the trial court's decision to revoke bail based on "testimony and evidence" introduced after its
initial bail decision).
95. PRETRIAL JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 7, at 19.
96. More detailed study of these procedures could prove useful.
97. 3 ROBERT G. BOGLE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NEW YORK § 55:21 (2d ed. 2009).
98. Colbert et al., supra note 81, at 1733.
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In at least a few jurisdictions, motions to reduce bail or for the defendant's
release pending trial afford some aspects of a process resembling preliminary
injunctions: meaningful written briefing addressing the statutory factors by which
bail is to be set, supporting swom evidence or declarations under penalty of per-
jury, or an in-person hearing.9 9 A Michigan treatise suggests that before seeking a
bail reduction at arraignment, defense counsel should file a written brief,"oo to
which the government may sometimes respond by filing its own brief."'o At least
for cases involving felonies, Florida requires that courts hear applications for bail
modification in person with the defendant present.1 02 Utah requires sufficient
notice for the other party to prepare for a hearing on a motion to modify the origi-
nal bail order, but Utah also provides that such motions can be resolved based on
various sources including information provided by a pretrial services agency or
"any other reliable record or source."103 For at least some felonies, California
relies fairly heavily on bail schedules as its default but provides meaningful pro-
cedure allowing for deviations from that schedule in either direction.104 Such a
departure requires two-day written notice to opposing counsel, appointed counsel
for unrepresented efendants, a hearing in open court where both sides have the
opportunity to be heard, and a stated explanation from the court for the depar-
ture. 05 Moreover, California requires automatic review at a hearing of the initial
bail determination for defendants still in custody five days after the arrest.1 0 6
Motions to reduce bail in California may require supporting evidence, though in
some courts a lawyer's proffer is sufficient.107 For some felony offenses and for
violating a domestic violence restraining order, setting bail above the scheduled
amount requires the declaration of a peace officer under penalty of perjury setting
forth the facts and circumstances demonstrating why higher bail is necessary to
ensure the defendant's appearance or protect a victim. 08
99. See 8 C.J.S. Bail § 129 (2017) ("Upon a motion for reduction of bail, a court may neither deny a
hearing nor accept ex parte in camera evidence." (footnote omitted)); cf. Michael S. Woodruff, Note,
The Excessive Bail Clause: Achieving Pretrial Justice Reform Through Incorporation, 66 RUTGERS L.
REV. 241, 275 (2013) (noting that "[w]hile statutory applications for bail review vary by state, they can
be discussed in general terms" as to jurisdiction and methods for challenging unfavorable decisions).
100. See 1 GLLESPIE MICHIGAN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE WITH FORMS § 13:9 (2d ed. 2017);
see also MICH. CT. R. 6.106(H)(2) (2016) (providing for bail reduction procedures, including that the
court may modify release decisions "on the motion of a party or its own initiative" prior to, at, or after
arraignment).
101. See, e.g., People's Answer to Motion to Request Bond, People v. Taylor, No. CR-W-07-364-
FC, 2008 WL 2035457 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 8, 2008).
102. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.035(2) (West 2018).
103. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-1(5)-(6) (West 2017).
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270.1 (West 2011). Its heavy use of bail schedules is very much in doubt.
See In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 (Ct. App.), review granted, 417 P.3d 769 (Cal. 2018). In the
interest of full disclosure, I signed an amicus brief supporting Mr. Humphrey in that case.
105. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1270.1.
106. Id. § 1270.2.
107. LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4:22 (2018).
108. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1269c (West 2011).
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A scant few defendants receive much more process. For instance, Paul
Manafort and Richard Gates's bail hearing lasted thirty-eight minutes and found
the government consenting to pretrial liberty on conditions.109 When the govem-
ment accused Manafort of tampering with witnesses while out on bail, he had
eleven days of freedom and written briefing by his lawyers arguing that the quan-
tity of evidence supporting those tampering allegations was sparse before he then
received a one-hour hearing on the government's motion to revoke his bond.1 0
Most defendants would have been detained immediately.1 1
2. Civil
Preliminary injunctions that determine the parties' rights until the court can
resolve the merits follow written briefing supported by swom evidence and often-
lengthy hearings in open court. To adjudicate a preliminary injunction motion,
courts resolve substantial factual disputes based on detailed evidentiary submis-
sions.1 12 Indeed, there is even a meaningful debate about the extent to which such
evidence must satisfy the Federal Rules of Evidence.113 For that reason, the par-
ties are typically afforded discovery to help resolve preliminary injunction
motions.114 District courts must carefully consider the particular facts of the case
and the legal standards; merely stating in cursory fashion that he factors are
109. See Minute Entry, United States v. Manafort, 314 F. Supp. 3d 258 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1:17-cr-
00201), ECF No. 8.
110. See Peter Maass, Paul Manafort Has Inadvertently Helped America by Showing the
Absurdities of Its Bail System, INTERCEPT (June 9, 2018, 9:04 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/06/
09/paul-manafort-bail-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/WDH7-A7W2]; Tierney Sneed, Judge Sends
Manafort to Jail After Revoking His Bail, TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 15, 2018, 11:44 AM), https://
talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/judge-sends-manafort-to-jail-after-revoking-his-bail [https://perma.cc/
JZH7-3BMZ].
111. For one particularly apt contrast, see Scott Hechinger (@ScottHech), TWITTER (June 9, 2018,
7:08 AM), https://twitter.com/ScottHech/status/1005451651854098432 [https://perma.cc/AD7C-5CJQ]
("Last night: I argued bail on 8 cases in 20 minutes. Also last night: Manafort's attorneys submitted a 9
page bail response, filed 5 days after Mueller requested to revoke release, all of which will be argued in a
robust hearing next Friday, while he remains at liberty. 2 systems."). See also Maass, supra note 110
("[T]he process afforded to the privileged is not afforded to the majority of people who are arrested.").
112. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (recounting the factual dispute);
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (stating that the burden of proof on "motion for
preliminary injunctive relief ... is much higher" than on a motion for summary judgment); 11 A WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 11, § 2949, at 237, 241-42 ("Evidence that goes beyond the unverified allegations of
the pleadings and motion papers must be presented to support or oppose a motion for a preliminary
injunction. Affidavits are appropriate on a preliminary-injunction motion and typically will be offered
by both parties.... Depositions also may be introduced.").
113. See generally Maggie Wittlin, Evidence, Meta-Evidence, and Preliminary Injunctions (Nov. 10,
2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining that under existing practice parties file
evidentiary motions and judges consider evidentiary issues in the preliminary injunction context).
114. See, e.g., Trefelner ex rel. Trefelner v. Burrell Sch. Dist., 655 F. Supp. 2d 581, 599 (W.D. Pa.
2009) (extending a temporary restraining order to permit discovery before a preliminary injunction
hearing); see also SEC v. Gonzalez de Castilla, 184 F. Supp. 2d 365, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting
leave to amend based on discovery related to the government's preliminary injunction motion); FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(d) advisory committee's note to 1993 amendments (explaining that early discovery is
"appropriate in some cases, such as those involving requests for a preliminary injunction").
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satisfied is insufficient. 15
For a recent example of preliminary injunction litigation, consider a false
advertising lawsuit regarding Arla Foods's publicity campaign against a hormone
that Elanco produces to help increase lactation by dairy cows. Elanco supported
its motion for a preliminary injunction with declarations under penalty of perjury
by two high-ranking employees and one outside scientist substantiating the
claims, which included an explanation of the science behind them and 317 pages
of supporting exhibits.116 Elanco also filed a thirty-page written brief. 117 The
defendants responded with their own twenty-nine-page written brief,18 supported
by declarations of the CEO and two scientists and 122 pages of documentary sup-
port addressing the science underlying the claims in detail (including the two sci-
entists' CVs to demonstrate their qualifications).119 The court resolved the motion
after a hearing that lasted more than five and a half hours, included the testimony
of two witnesses, and generated a 231-page transcript.12 0
For a public law example, consider recent litigation over the second iteration
of the travel ban. Although the plaintiffs in the Maryland case filed their motion
for preliminary injunction a mere four days after the revised executive order was
issued and concurrently with their complaint, plaintiffs attached 420 pages of
supporting evidence (in addition to the 166 pages they had filed supporting a sim-
ilar motion earlier in the case challenging the first iteration of the travel ban).12 1
These documents included Trump's own statements belying his stated national
security interest and declarations under penalty of perjury by the individual and
organizational plaintiffs detailing the ways in which the executive order would
harm them if enforced. The court then heard oral argument for more than ninety
115. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 26-27 (reversing the grant of a preliminary injunction based in part on
the district court's "cursory" treatment of the balance of equities and public interest factors).
116. Declaration of Grady Bishop, Exhibits 1-13, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., No. 17-C-703-
WCG, 2017 WL 4570547 (E.D. Wis. June 15, 2017), ECF No. 5; Declaration of Roger A. Cady, Ph.D.,
Exhibits 1-6, Eli Lilly & Co., 2017 WL 4570547, ECF No. 6; Declaration of Robert J. Collier, Ph.D.,
Exhibits A-C, Eli Lilly & Co., 2017 WL 4570547, ECF No. 21; Supplemental Declaration of Grady
Bishop, Exhibit A-E, Eli Lilly & Co., 2017 WL 4570547, ECF No. 30. I excluded cover pages from this
count.
117. Brief in Support of Elanco's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Eli Lilly & Co., 2017 WL
4570547, ECF No. 7.
118. Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Eli Lilly &
Co., 2017 WL 4570547, ECF No. 25.
119. Id. Exhibits A-C.
120. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing at 1, 10, 44, 72-74, 110, 149, 192, 230, Eli Lilly &
Co., 2017 WL 4570547, ECF No. 14 (noting that the hearing began at 9:30 A.M. and ended at 4:52 P.M.
and that recesses occurred from 10:33-10:45 A.M., 12:22-1:34 P.M., 2:29-2:40 P.M., and 3:51-3:57
P.M. and indicating that Elanco called two witnesses).
121. Joint App. at 39-204, 262-681, Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th
Cir. 2017) (No. 17-1351), ECF No. 34, vacated, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017); Plaintiffs' Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order of the Exec. Order & Memorandum of Law
in Support Thereof & Exhibit 12, Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539
(D. Md. 2017) (No. 8:17-cv-00361), ECF No. 95.
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minutes.12 2 Based on the factual record, the lower federal courts concluded that
the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause
claim, that the plaintiffs had standing, and that they were likely to suffer irrepara-
ble harm.123 In its ruling, the Fourth Circuit deemed the government's invocation
of a national security interest "rote" based on its lack of evidentiary support;124 it
weighed that lack of evidence against he evidence demonstrating harm to the
plaintiffs to support its conclusion that the balance of equities favored the
plaintiffs. 125
3. Comparison
There are several important differences between the procedures afforded to
civil defendants when opposing a motion for preliminary injunction and those
afforded to criminal defendants seeking pretrial liberty or bail reduction. First,
factual disputes can be "resolved" against criminal defendants by the govern-
ment's lawyer merely proffering what she will prove later whereas civil plaintiffs
must demonstrate their entitlement to relief through sworn evidence. Second,
seeking bail reduction necessarily asks the court to recognize, at least impliedly,
that its earlier decision was mistaken;1 26 by contrast, when there are two different
procedural devices-the temporary restraining order (TRO) and the preliminary
injunction-a court can deny one after granting the other without implying any
inconsistency between these rulings.127 Criminal defendants have the onus of ask-
ing the court to revisit that initial determination, whereas civil plaintiffs must
again demonstrate their entitlement to a preliminary injunction anew.128 Lastly,
even if the procedures were equal, it would nonetheless be more difficult for
criminal defendants to coordinate with their lawyers from behind bars than for
civil defendants who can much more easily aid their lawyers' investigations.129
122. Transcript of Proceedings Hearing for Temporary Restraining Order at 1, 74, in Joint App.,
supra note 121, at 682, 755.
123. Int'1Refugee Assistance Project, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 549-52 (discussing standing); id. at 553-64
(discussing the likelihood of success on the merits); id. at 564-65 (discussing potential of irreparable
harm); see also Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 572 (describing "an Executive Order that in
text speaks with vague words of national security, but in context drips with religious intolerance,
animus, and discrimination").
124. Int'lRefugeeAssistanceProject, 857 F.3d at 603-04.
125. Id. That the Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit opinion as moot after the second version
of the travel ban expired, Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017), and ultimately
upheld the third version of the travel ban, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), does not undermine
the usefulness of the example for illustrating the process afforded.
126. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 12.1(c), at 13 (3d ed. 2007)
(explaining that defense counsel "'usually comes into a case after the initial bail has been set,' and thus
is in the disadvantageous position of trying 'to change a decision which was formulated without his
presence').
127. But cf. Lynch, supra note 66, at 800 (articulating concern that a court's determination regarding
likelihood of success on the merits for purposes of preliminary injunction will overly sway its ultimate
merits conclusion).
128. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 126, § 12.1(c), at 13-15.
129. See, e.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 82-84; see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951)
("This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense.
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In practice, the closer comparison to pretrial detention proceedings on the civil
side is not preliminary injunctions but TROs. However, TROs presumptively
cannot exceed fourteen days,130 and even TROs require sworn evidence.
Moreover, the fourteen-day period may be shortened because the defendant can
be heard to dissolve or modify the TRO on two days' notice to the plaintiff.131
Through the lens of the TRO comparison, civil plaintiffs bear a greater burden to
demonstrate why the defendant should not lose a property right for two weeks or
less than the government does when it seeks to deprive an unconvicted defendant
of her liberty for some undetermined period that may stretch for years.13 2 These
disparities are troubling.1 33
Other existing procedural protections might seem to allow criminal defendants
to challenge weak cases against them, but they do not as a practical matter.134
Unless a defendant has been indicted by a grand jury, a defendant can be detained
only if, within forty-eight hours after arrest, a magistrate finds probable cause that
the defendant committed the charged crime.1 35 But this Gerstein hearing can
occur after the defendant has already been jailed for two days (often in terrible
conditions),1 36 need not be adversarial, and does not afford a rigorous look at the
merits.137 In many jurisdictions, the government must also demonstrate probable
cause at a preliminary hearing (or bindover hearing) for its case to proceed unless
the defendant waives that right.138 But defendants often waive that right, whether
because they view the opportunity as rote process unlikely to yield any benefit,
Arpit Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL
STUD. 471 (2016) (demonstrating adverse case outcomes for incarcerated defendants); Stevenson, supra
note 84 (same).
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2).
131. Id. 65(b)(4).
132. Some defendants, like Kalief Browder, may spend years in pretrial detention before charges are
dismissed. Gonnerman, supra note 8. See generally supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text (providing
examples of defendants detained for lengthy periods of time but never convicted).
133. Below I suggest that he inverted power dynamic between the two systems may give rise to this
disparity in both procedure and substance. See infra text accompanying note 202.
134. Cf. Kuckes, supra note 45, at 3 ("It may surprise those not steeped in the intricacies of criminal
procedure to learn that hearing rights constitutionally required for individuals threatened with adverse
government action in civil settings are not necessarily enjoyed by criminal defendants.").
135. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) ("[A] jurisdiction that provides
judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with
the promptness requirement of Gerstein."); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (requiring
prompt judicial determination of probable cause).
136. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 6 ("Jail conditions nationally are dreadful . . . . The jail
environment is often 'chaotic' because resources are scarce, staff often lack adequate training,
classification of inmates is random, and turnover is quick. Despite some efforts at reform, there are
countless stories of jail abuse, gang rapes, illness, overcrowding, and other unsafe and abusive
conditions nationwide." (footnote omitted)).
137. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120.
138. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 126, § 14.1(a), at 274; see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 15A-606 (West 2017).
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because they obtain something valuable in exchange, or both.139 And preliminary
hearings are typically not required when prosecutors charge by indictment.140
Many jurisdictions allow the government to rely on inadmissible evidence at the
preliminary hearing, including hearsay.14 1 Lastly, the probable cause standard
that the government must meet at a preliminary hearing is lower than the likeli-
hood of success standard for preliminary injunctions.14 2 As one commentator
puts it:
[D]efendants constitutionally may be arrested, charged, prosecuted, and
detained in prison pending trial with fewer meaningful review procedures-
that is to say, procedures to test the legitimacy of the underlying charges-
than due process would require in the preliminary stages of a private civil case
seeking the return of household goods.1"3
In sum, although there are several procedures that ostensibly protect defend-
ants from unwarranted criminal process, they are far less meaningful in practice.
Thus, criminal law's additional procedures do not justify the broader disparity
between procedural protections for civil versus criminal defendants regarding in-
terim relief.
B. SUBSTANTIVE COMPARISON
The substantive comparison between pretrial detention a d preliminary injunc-
tion standards also reveals a stark disparity. Preliminarily enjoining a defendant
is an "extraordinary and drastic remedy,"144 and thus the civil system requires
plaintiffs to demonstrate "likelihood of irreparable injury" to obtain a prelimi-
nary injunction.145 In criminal law, the threshold for the public's interest in deten-
tion is set quite low-some likelihood that the defendant will be accused of
another crime, however minor, or some likelihood that the defendant will not
appear for further proceedings.
Civil systems seek to minimize harm during the pendency of the case by
requiring judges to explicitly balance each side's interests: the harms that would
befall the plaintiff absent the injunction versus the harms that the injunction
139. See, e.g., 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 126, § 14.2(e), at 311 ("[W]aivers by the defense
exceed fifty percent in a substantial number of jurisdictions which provide quite extensive preliminary
hearings."); see also Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to
New Realities, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 541, 576 ("[E]ven where a defendant has a right to a preliminary
hearing, it has become so meaningless in some jurisdictions that the defendant typically waives the
right .... ).
140. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a)(2); 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 126, § 14.2(c)-(d), at 300-08.
141. 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 126, § 14.4(b), at 341-43.
142. Alschuler, supra note 46, at 519; Kuckes, supra note 45, at 24 n.132; see also, e.g., Desper v.
State, 318 S.E.2d 437, 445 (W. Va. 1984) (stating that magistrates can manage preliminary hearings to
prevent them from becoming an "endless wrangle relating to the existence of probable cause").
143. Kuckes, supra note 45, at 22.
144. 11 A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 2948, at 119 (footnotes omitted).
145. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,21 (2008) (emphasis added).
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would impose on the defendant.146 In criminal law, by contrast, courts analyze
pretrial detention questions with a sole focus on the extent to which not detaining
the defendant may harm the public-either because a defendant is accused of a
crime while on pretrial liberty or fails to appear for later court dates. Such analy-
sis ignores important harm-harm that detention inflicts on that defendant, her
loved ones, and the broader public.147
Chart 1 below illustrates the contrast between comparable aspects of the
existing civil and criminal standards. Let us then consider each system in more
detail.
CHART 1
Preliminary Injunctions Pretrial Detention
Likelihood of irreparable harm Some likelihood that the defendant will:
(1) be accused of a crime, however minor, or
(2) not appear for proceedings
Balance equities Harm to defendant and her loved ones not
analyzed
Likelihood of success based on Likelihood of success based on lawyers'
evidence say-so
1. Criminal
In criminal law, pretrial detention decisions doctrinally turn on two questions:
if granted pretrial iberty, does the defendant pose a risk of (1) rearrest or (2) fail-
ure to appear for a future court date?148 Most pretrial detention statutes direct
courts to rely on a relatively similar set of factors to resolve those two questions:
"the 'nature and circumstances' of the charged offense; the defendant's criminal
history (including the defendant's record of prior appearances at court proceed-
ings; the defendant's 'character, physical and mental condition' (including any
substance abuse history); and his or her ties to the jurisdiction (employment,
146. Id. at 24.
147. See Simonson, supra note 1 (explaining the serious harms that pretrial detention causes).
Notions of justice as accounting for harm to family members have ancient origins. See, e.g., CALEB
BINGHAM, THE COLUMBIAN ORATOR 36 (David W. Blight ed., N.Y. Univ. Press Bicentennial ed. 1998)
(1797) (explicating Genesis 44:18-34, including Judah's plea to Joseph to not punish Benjamin because
of the pain it would bring to his father Jacob: "Have pity. I beseech you, on the deplorable condition of
an old man, stripped of his last comfort; .... Grant this request, not so much for the sake of the youth
himself, as of his absent father.. . .").
148. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 18-27; Gouldin, supra note 14, at 845-52; see also, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2012) (permitting pretrial detention if no release conditions "will reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community"); United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (quoting § 3142(e)).
524 [Vol. 107:501
2019] JAIL AS INJUNCTION 525
family, or length of residence)."149 Many jurisdictions also consider the "weight
of the evidence against the person" as part of determining the defendant's danger-
ousness or likelihood not to appear;15 0 a few jurisdictions do not.1 5 1 Some gener-
alized facts about the defendant or her offense factor into the analysis but only to
help the court consider the likely harm from her pretrial liberty; none of the analy-
sis bears on how pretrial detention would harm the defendant or others.15 2 In
short, judges in criminal law consider only the potential harm that allowing the
defendant to enjoy her liberty may cause and ignore any harm of detention or ben-
efits of pretrial liberty.
Some court systems rely on data-driven algorithmic measures of pretrial risk to
measure risk of rearrest and nonappearance.153 Unfortunately, most risk-assess-
ment tools do not separately score those two risks,1 54 which-as Lauryn Gouldin
persuasively explains-is quite problematic.1 5 5
Many risk-assessment tools place defendants in the highest risk of rearrest cat-
egory at strikingly low probabilities. For instance, one tool labels defendants with
a ten percent chance of being arrested for any crime during the pretrial period as
"high risk." 1 56 Other tools place defendants in the highest risk category who have
a fifteen or seventeen percent chance of being accused of a crime while on pretrial
liberty. 157 A couple of tools use a threshold of forty-two percent or greater if
stretched over a longer period, but they do so by counting arrests of all types,
including for traffic offenses.1 58
149. Gouldin, supra note 14, at 865-66.
150. NAT'L CRIM. JUSTICE Ass'N, PROJECT TO DEVELOP A MODEL ANTI-STALKING CODE FOR STATES
58-60 (1993), https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015050309775 [https://perma.cc/E2Y6-FCSR]; see
also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2) (2012); FLA. STAT. § 903.046(2)(b) (2016); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 510.30(2)(a)(viii) (McKinney 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.222(C)(2) (West 2014). Federal
law first countenanced weighing the evidence in the criminal rules in 1944, but early U.S. law allowed
courts not to presume that capital defendants were entitled o bail so long as "there was significant proof
that the person committed the alleged crime." BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 18, 21-22.
151. NAT'L CRIM. JUSTICE Ass'N, supra note 150, at 58-60; see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275
(West 2018) (making no mention of the "weight of the evidence").
152. Cf. Simonson, supra note 1, at 606-21 (arguing that community bail funds demonstrate that the
public's interest is often better served by pretrial liberty rather than detention); Yang, supra note 27, at
1404 (arguing that pretrial detention overlooks costs to defendants and their loved ones).
153. Gouldin, supra note 27, at 713-14 (explaining problems with risk-assessment tools); Mayson,
supra note 13, at 508-18 (explaining the newfound prevalence of algorithmic pretrial-risk-assessment
tools and categorizing their various features).
154. Gouldin, supra note 14, at 867-71; Mayson, supra note 13, at 512.
155. Gouldin, supra note 14, at 867-71. These tools also give rise to a host of other concerns. See
Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT'G REP.
237 (2015) (arguing against risk-assessment tools because their use of prior criminal records proxies for
race due to disparities in criminal law enforcement); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the
Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 821-62 (2014) (arguing that use of
risk-assessment tools at sentencing violates the Equal Protection Clause).
156. Mayson, supra note 13, at 514.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 515. It is not always clear what "any new arrest" encompasses for each tool, but the most
natural reading seems to include traffic offenses.
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Most tools also do not distinguish between the risks of being accused of a vio-
lent versus a nonviolent crime.159 But even the risk-assessment tools that distin-
guish violent from nonviolent crime risk place the accused into the "high risk"
category for rearrest for a violent crime at a strikingly low likelihood. Defendants
accused of violent crimes are placed in the highest risk categories with an 8%
likelihood of rearrest according to one tool and an 8.6% likelihood of rearrest
according to another.160
Moreover, these tools estimate the likelihood that the defendant will be
arrested rather than the likelihood of conviction. In other words, they look to the
likelihood of being accused of a crime, not the likelihood that the defendant will
actually do something illegal.16 1
After assessing the possibility that the defendant will be accused of a crime
while on pretrial liberty and the possibility that the defendant will not appear
for further proceedings, judges decide whether to: release the defendant on her
own recognizance without conditions, release the defendant with conditions, or
simply order the defendant detained.16 2 The most common condition on pretrial
liberty-and most common resolution of whether to allow a defendant to have
pretrial liberty-is money bail. Most defendants (sixty-one percent) are detained
unless they can post bail.16 3
Money bail requires the defendant to post a certain amount of money to secure
her pretrial liberty that will be returned to her when she appears for further legal
proceedings. Some statutes and rules sensibly provide that pretrial detention or fi-
nancial conditions on pretrial liberty should be last resorts.164 Bail should not be
set so high, several statutes provide, that it serves as a backdoor to detention
159. Id. at 511-12.
160. Id. at 514.
161. See Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3167521 [https://perma.cc/D8T7-YTNQ] (arguing that, although they stem from mere
accusations, arrests are often treated practically and rhetorically as indicating guilt).
162. For a more detailed explanation of pretrial liberty in its various permutations, see BAUGHMAN,
supra note 2, at 37-59.
163. JESSICA EAGLIN & DANYELLE SOLOMON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REDUCING RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JAILS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOCAL PRACTICE 19 (2015), https://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Racial%20Disparities%20Report%20062515.pdf.
164. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012) ("The judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of the
person on personal recognizance, or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond . . . unless the
judicial officer determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the community."); id. § 3142(c) (providing
that "[i]f the judicial officer determines that the release described in subsection (b) of this section will
not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other
person or the community," the judicial officer shall impose "the least restrictive further condition[s]"
necessary to achieve those goals); see also Amber Widgery, Guidance for Setting Release Conditions,
NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 13, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/guidance-for-setting-release-conditions.aspx [https://perma.cc/6LNL-S77T] (listing which
jurisdictions require courts to presume that defendants should be released on recognizance or unsecured
bail).
526 [Vol. 107:501
2019] JAIL AS INJUNCTION 527
because the defendant cannot pay it.165
Nonetheless, judges frequently set bail that defendants cannot afford.166 Ninety
percent of pretrial detainees are there not because a judge has deemed them too
dangerous for pretrial liberty but simply because they cannot afford to pay their
bail.16 7 This is partly because some defendants cannot afford what must seem to
judges like paltry sums.168 In total, sixty percent of defendants are detained before
trial, whether because they cannot afford their bail or because the judge denied
bail entirely.169
Our current money bail systems detain defendants based principally on
whether they are poor.170 This disparity has received plenty of popular attention
recently.17 1 Money bail systems detain too many people who are not dangerous
and grant liberty to defendants who are.172 In short, money bail systems are fun-
damentally flawed.173
Sometimes bail is set merely by reference to a schedule that considers only the
charged offense and perhaps the defendant's criminal history. The Houston bail
schedule system has been preliminarily enjoined since a district court found that
plaintiffs were likely to succeed in demonstrating that it discriminates against the
poor.1 74 Before the recent litigation, Houston set bail by reference to a schedule
165. See, e.g., § 3142(c)(2) ("The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in
the pretrial detention of the person."); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 89, § 10-5.3
(a), at 17 ("The judicial officer should not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial
detention of the defendant solely due to an inability to pay.").
166. See, e.g., Gouldin, supra note 14, at 863 ("Thirty-plus years after federal and state statutes were
rewritten to fix this precise problem by permitting judges to order dangerous defendants to be detained,
money bail is still used as a back-door means to manage dangerousness . . . ."); Dewan, supra note 26
("'The bail is really being set to keep the person in custody. You have to kind of concede that,' said a
California judge, W. Kent Hamlin of Superior Court in Fresno County. 'It's not supposed to be that; it's
supposed to guarantee their appearance in court. They're innocent until proven guilty, but the bail
system assumes they're guilty."').
167. REAVES, supra note 15, at 15.
168. In New York City, thirty-one percent of misdemeanants were incarcerated because they could
not afford $500 or less to make bail. RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
INCARCERATION'S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 32 (2015).
169. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 4.
170. See, e.g., Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 58, at 737-38 (finding in Harris County,
Texas that defendants from the poorest zip codes are detained much more frequently than similarly-
situated defendants from high-income zip codes).
171. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 28 (articulating problems with the U.S. pretrial detention system);
Casey Tolan, Making Freedom Free, SLATE (Mar. 29, 2017, 10:15AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/trials-anderror/2017/03/poor-defendants_getlocked_upjbecausetheycan t fford_
cash bail heres.html?wpsrc=sh all tab tw ru [https://perma.cc/6QVF-ZSWA] ("[L]ess affluent
defendants are stuck in jail for low-level crimes while wealthy ones can buy their freedom by writing a
check."); supra note 17 and accompanying text (relaying the remarks of U.S. Attorney General Loretta
Lynch).
172. Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 77, at 28.
173. See, e.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 157-85; Gershowitz, supra note 25 (manuscript at 23-
24). This Article does not seek to demonstrate the problems with money bail but focuses instead on
reconceiving pretrial detention more broadly.
174. ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 157, 166-67 (5th Cir. 2018), aff g 251 F. Supp. 3d
1052, 1107 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
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where bail for low-level alleged misdemeanants without a criminal record was
set at $500.175 It did not consider defendants' ability to pay. Houston is hardly
alone in its use of bail schedules.176 In most jurisdictions, specific facts about the
defendant or the charged crime that might bear on harm to the government from
pretrial liberty-namely, criminal history or a more serious charged offense-
warranted higher bail.1 77
Judges all too frequently seem to assume that detention better serves the pub-
lic's interest than pretrial liberty because detention protects safety.17 8 This
assumption is shortsighted. Community bail funds involve members of a commu-
nity posting bail for strangers, demonstrating that the community would be better
served if some defendants who are now detained were afforded pretrial liberty.179
Many prosecutors and law enforcement officials have recognized that the current
state of pretrial detention increases criminality and "has adverse consequences
for public safety."8 o Moreover, current money bail systems create a perception
of unfairness that risks undermining safety because it can decrease the willing-
ness of victims and witnesses to cooperate with police-a procedural justice con-
cern.81 Communities might rather have their residents free to earn money at
work, raise their children, and have a fighting chance to contest criminal charges
against them, except in cases where the defendant poses serious public safety
risks.18 2
In sum, the criminal legal system currently decides which defendants are
granted liberty before trial and which remain incarcerated by considering only
the harm that their liberty might cause the public and ignoring any countervailing
considerations. And after making that decision, the criminal legal system often
requires defendants to pay for their freedom, which many cannot do.183
175. Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 58, at 730.
176. See id. at 733 & n.105 (providing that "the use of a schedule specifying bail amounts based on
the charge and prior convictions is not uncommon" and is the subject of "ten class action challenges in
eight states").
177. NAT'L CRIM. JUSTICE Ass'N, supra note 150, at 58-60.
178. See Simonson, supra note 1, at 615 ("[J]udges routinely name protecting the 'community' as a
reason for a bail decision.").
179. See id. at 628; see also Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention,
Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1365 (2012) (proposing a "bail
jury" to better represent the community's voice than existing structures).
180. Amici Curiae Brief of Current and Former Prosecutors and Law Enf't Officials in Support of
Respondent Kenneth Humphrey at 10-12, In re Humphrey, 417 P.3d 769 (Cal. 2018) (No. S247278)
[hereinafter Humphrey, Current and Former Prosecutors' Brief], https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Humphrey-Amicus-Brief-FINAL.pdf.
181. Id.
182. Simonson, supra note 1, at 615.
183. See generally Russell M. Gold, Paying for Pretrial Detention (Aug. 14, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing in detail the concerning financial incentives that criminal
law uses surrounding pretrial detention and comparing it to preliminary injunctions' use of financial
incentives).
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2. Civil
By contrast, preliminary injunctions set a high threshold for the interest neces-
sary to secure relief before judgment and balance all relevant interests during the
pendency of the case. They do so because preliminary injunction doctrine treats
interim relief as an extraordinary measure and sensibly seeks to minimize interim
harm-that is, harm caused by granting or denying preliminary relief in a way
that does not accord with the later merits decision.184
Preliminary injunctions are "extraordinary remed[ies] never awarded as of
right" but only after courts "balance the competing claims of injury and . .. con-
sider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested
relief."8 A preliminary injunction is warranted only when irreparable injury to
the plaintiff in its absence is likely.186 Mere possibility is not enough.1 87
Doctrinally, the Supreme Court has articulated a four-factor test to implement
this principle of minimizing harm caused by an erroneous preliminary injunction
ruling. Courts cannot grant a preliminary injunction unless the plaintiff demon-
strates that: (1) she will likely suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief,
(2) the balance of equities between the parties favors preliminary relief, (3) she is
likely to succeed on the merits, and (4) an injunction serves the public interest.8 8
There are sensible critiques of some of the particulars, such as the alge-
braic formula that Judge Posner has sought to impose on this area of law 8 9
and whether to recognize some extent of uncertainty in the ultimate merits
184. See Leubsdorf, supra note 31, at 541 ("The danger of incorrect preliminary assessment is the
key to the analysis of interlocutory relief. It requires investigating the harm an erroneous interim
decision may cause and trying to minimize that harm."); Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits, 116
YALE L.J. 1284, 1287 & n.3 (2007) (identifying "minimiz[ing] deviations from what will be the ultimate
ruling on the merits" as "the goal according to virtually every scholarly and judicial account" of
preliminary injunctions); see also, e.g., Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593
(7th Cir. 1986) (deploying an algebraic formula for minimizing probable harm through interim relief).
One interesting article suggests that courts should deploy preliminary injunctions to maximize social
welfare rather than simply to minimize harm. See generally Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F.
Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 381 (2005). But these authors recognize that hey are prescribing an approach that does not align
with current doctrine. Id. at 389.
185. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (quotation omitted).
186. Id. at 22.
187. Id.
188. E.g., id. at 20; see also 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 2948, at 123-24 (explaining the
preliminary injunction standard). As a practical matter, although all four prongs come into play,
likelihood of success on the merits can play an outsized role. See John Leubsdorf, Preliminary
Injunctions: In Defense of the Merits, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 35 (2007) ("Under existing law as well
as the Leubsdorf-Posner formulation, the strength of the plaintiff's case under the substantive law-
usually referred to as the plaintiff's likelihood of prevailing-is an important, perhaps the most
important, factor in determining whether the plaintiff can obtain preliminary relief. Courts often decide
motions for preliminary injunctions almost entirely on this ground."). Criminal procedure should not
embrace the civil standard in this respect.
189. See Linda S. Mullenix, Burying (With Kindness) the Felicific Calculus of Civil Procedure, 40
VAND. L. REV. 541, 545-48, 550 (1987); Linda J. Silberman, Injunctions by the Numbers: Less Than the
Sum of Its Parts, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 279, 280-82, 287, 304 (1987); see also Am. Hosp. Supply v.
Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing the preliminary injunction formula).
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decision.190 But on the broad parameters relevant to this Article, preliminary
injunction law is quite consistent.191
Depriving a defendant of its property interest before the case is resolved on its
merits is an extraordinary remedy. That is why preliminary injunctions cannot issue
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that she will likely suffer irreparable harm with-
out preliminary relief.192 Or as one leading hornbook puts it, "the irreparable harm
requirement serves a special purpose; it provides a barrier against the easy use of
public power without a trial." 1 93 In addition to this high threshold for granting relief
without trial, because courts seek to minimize the harm of granting or denying such
preliminary relief they need to account for and balance all relevant interests that
would be affected by interim relief.194 Lastly, because courts do not want to award
preliminary relief to those who will not ultimately be entitled to relief after judg-
ment, so too do they require plaintiffs to demonstrate likelihood of success on the
merits to obtain a preliminary injunction.195 This multipart inquiry seeks to ensure that
courts do not often deprive a party of its rights before judgment, inflict more harm
than good while the case is pending, or grant relief to those unlikely to warrant it.
3. Comparison
The differences-both procedural and substantive-between pretrial detention
and preliminary injunctions are striking. A civil plaintiff cannot obtain prelimi-
nary relief unless she makes several showings through actual evidence-typically
sworn declarations. She must show first that she will likely be irreparably harmed
absent that relief. Second, the plaintiff must prove that she will be harmed more
without the preliminary injunction than the defendant will be harmed by the
injunction. And third, the plaintiff must prove that she is likely to succeed on the
merits of her claim. Before such an injunction can issue, the defendant has an op-
portunity to be heard through robust briefing and a hearing.1 96
190. See generally Joshua P. Davis, Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Revising Injunction Doctrine, 34
RUTGERS L.J. 363 (2003) (advocating that courts should account for uncertainty about the merits
decision when deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctions).
191. See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
109, 111 n.4 (2001) ("[A]lthough the circuits sometimes differ in their articulation of the factors, the
differences generally do not reflect substantive disagreement as to the proper areas of inquiry.").
At a more granular level, preliminary injunction law does not live in a state of beautiful harmony
across the circuits. See, e.g., George P. Sibley III & Jonathan L. Caulder, An Empirical Look at
Preliminary Injunctions in Challenges Under Environmental Protection Laws, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10397
(2017) (detailing the circuit split); Bethany M. Bates, Note, Reconciliation after Winter: The Standard
for Preliminary Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522 (2011) (same). For now,
however, I have obscured these differences because they do not bear on the primary objective of this
Article-considering the conceptual lessons that the preliminary injunction standard offers for pretrial
detention. I take up the somewhat-varying standards below, to some extent. See infra Part III.
192. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (reversing the Ninth Circuit in part for requiring that the plaintiff
show only a "possibility" of irreparable injury).
193. DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 193.
194. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (holding that courts must balance the equities before granting
preliminary injunctive relief).
195. Id.
196. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a).
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By contrast, in some jurisdictions, the government can successfully deprive
people not convicted of a crime of their liberty so long as they are too poor to pay
for their freedom and the government can meet its pro forma obligation to dem-
onstrate probable cause.1 97 In other jurisdictions, the government can incarcerate
the accused based on whether an algorithm indicates a nontrivial risk that the de-
fendant will forget about her court date. And in striking contrast to the civil con-
text, defendants often get about a two-minute hearing and no opportunity for
briefing before the judge decides to lock them up.
These disparities between the civil and criminal context are troubling. If there
were to be a disparity between the two systems, the one that incarcerates people
and purports to presume people innocent until proven otherwise should give more
opportunity to defendants and require more proof from the government. Strong
empirical evidence that defendants who are incarcerated before trial face worse
outcomes-in both likelihood of conviction and length of sentencel9 8-makes
this comparison all the more concerning. Even though defendants are more likely
to be convicted of crimes and incarcerated longer, face a whole host of collateral
consequences and challenges upon reentry, and (unlike civil defendants) are out-
resourced by their adversaries,1 99 our justice system nonetheless affords them less
process and requires their opponent to satisfy a less stringent test than civil
defendants' adversaries before imposing an interim restraint.
One possible way to explain the existing disparity is that our legal procedures
place greater importance on property rights than liberty rights, but that distinction
does not hold up. Looking at civil forfeiture law suggests that wealth and power
drive the existing disparity between pretrial detention and preliminary injunc-
tions. Civil forfeiture allows the government to seize property from criminal
defendants with far less process than we would otherwise expect before the gov-
ernment seizes property from a private citizen.200 And according to Justice
197. Such an approach runs into substantial problems with the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., ODonnell v.
Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 161-63 (5th Cir. 2018) (discussing the Equal Protection Clause). But this
Article focuses on the notion that it is bad policy and neither legislatures nor courts-in their
administrative capacities-should permit it.
198. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER T. LowENKAMP ET AL., LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., INVESTIGATING
THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING OUTCOMEs 10 (2013), https://www.amoldfoundation.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ILJAIReport-state-sentencingFNL.pdf ("[D]efendants detained until trial
or case disposition are 4.44 times more likely to be sentenced to jail and 3.32 times more likely to be
sentenced to prison[,] ..... [and] [t]he jail sentence is 2.78 times longer for defendants who are detained for
the entire pretrial period, and the prison sentence is 2.36 times longer."); Dobbie et al., supra note 58, at 203
("[I]nitial pretrial release decreases the probability of being found guilty by 14.0 percentage points . . . ."); cf.
Gupta et al., supra note 129, at 471 (arguing that use of money bail increases the likelihood of conviction).
One explanation for longer sentence lengths is that pretrial detention may result in job loss and that lack of
employment, in turn, can remove a potential mitigating factor at sentencing. Yang, supra note 27, at 1419.
199. Gold, supra note 47, at 123-24.
200. See, e.g., Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting denial of
certiorari) (describing the civil forfeiture system as one "where police can seize property with limited
judicial oversight and retain it for their own use," which produces "egregious and well-chronicled
abuses"); see also Stefan B. Herpel, Toward a Constitutional Kleptocracy: Civil Forfeiture in America,
96 MICH. L. REV. 1910, 1911 (1998) (reviewing LEONARD LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE
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Thomas, " [t]hese forfeiture operations frequently target the poor and other groups
least able to defend their interests in forfeiture proceedings."2 0 1 Civil forfeiture
thus suggests that courts afford more process to (likely wealthy) civil defendants
than to (likely poor) criminal defendants, no matter whether property or liberty is
at stake.202 Indeed, the lack of process for accused criminal defendants helps
reveal a criminal legal system that too often equates accusation with guilt and im-
plicitly embodies a notion that the accused are bad and therefore deserve the
rough treatment including incarceration that criminal law affords.203
The conceptual objectives of preliminary injunctions are limiting prejudgment
relief and balancing all interests to enjoin a defendant only when doing so would
be more beneficial than costly. By contrast, the current judicial inquiry for pretrial
detention is a one-sided affair where courts consider only the potential risks to
the public that pretrial liberty would pose and ignore all interests that cut the other
way-setting a low threshold for prejudgment relief all the while. These dispar-
ities are not justifiable.
III. ENVISIONING PRETRIAL DETENTION AS INTERIM RELIEF
Although the purported aims of pretrial detention-preventing flight risk
and future harm-are worthy objectives,2 04 there is little to commend the meta-
stasizing of pretrial detention and the current systems in which detention is
largely regulated through money bail. The scope of pretrial detention alone is
concerning. Since the late 1990s, "the United States has gone from releasing
OF PROPERTY (1996)) ("[C]ivil in rem forfeiture proceedings have been used - and increasingly are
being used - as an expedient to circumvent the usual protections accorded to defendants in criminal
proceedings, and to augment federal, state, and local treasuries.").
201. Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 848.
202. Gold, supra note 47, at 141-42. Defending in detail the view that wealth and power rather than
liberty versus property provides the operative distinction here is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
more detailed discussion see Gold, supra note 183.
203. See, e.g., ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL
CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 2-5 (2018) (arguing that lower criminal courts
provide a form of social control and surveillance that extends well beyond convictions and sentences
including marking individuals for further surveillance and subjecting them to the procedural hassle of
legal proceedings); Roberts, supra note 161 (manuscript at 12-32) (detailing ways that criminal law
equates arrest and guilt).
204. Shima Baradaran Baughman convincingly explains why the latter objective is inconsistent with
the presumption of innocence. See generally Baradaran, supra note 27. But the Supreme Court does not
agree. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (tying the presumption of innocence to the burden
of proof in criminal trials and explaining that "it has no application to a determination of the rights of a
pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun"); see also United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("This case brings before the Court for the first time a
statute in which Congress declares that a person innocent of any crime may be jailed indefinitely,
pending the trial of allegations which are legally presumed to be untrue, if the Government shows to the
satisfaction of a judge that the accused is likely to commit crimes, unrelated to the pending charges, at
any time in the future. Such statutes, consistent with the usages of tyranny and the excesses of what
bitter experience teaches us to call the police state, have long been thought incompatible with the
fundamental human rights protected by our Constitution. Today a majority of this Court holds
otherwise."); Baradaran, supra note 27, at 738-54 (describing the Supreme Court's doctrinal
undermining of the presumption of innocence).
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62% of defendants to only 40%."205 It would be difficult to make the case that
this massive pretrial detention is necessary to promote public safety; "65% of
pretrial detainees were held on nonviolent charges only, and 20% were charged
with minor public-order offenses."20 6 Despite the decline in crime, jail popula-
tions have continued to grow as more arrestees are detained before trial.207
This heavy use of pretrial detention is all the more concerning when, as one
empirical study found, arrest while on pretrial liberty "is actually quite
unlikely," and "about half of those detained have a lower chance of being rear-
rested pretrial than many of the people released."208 So too does detention
decrease the likelihood that the defendant will appear for her legal proceed-
ings.20 9 And even in the more immediate term, jails are not free; overusing
them wastes tax dollars.2 10
This Part envisions a pretrial detention regime that more closely resembles the
civil preliminary injunction standard insofar as it requires a significant burden to
warrant granting the "plaintiff' the relief she seeks before resolving the merits
and accounts for all relevant interests. Section III.A explains that pretrial deten-
tion would look much more stringently for likelihood of irreparable harm to the
public from the defendant's pretrial liberty before ordering a defendant detained
than it does now. Neither a probability that the defendant may forget about her
court date nor that she may be accused of a nonviolent misdemeanor would jus-
tify detention (whether directly or by setting unaffordable bail). Section III.B
explains how such a model would consider harm from pretrial detention to the de-
fendant and her loved ones and balance that harm against any benefit from detain-
ing the defendant o the government and other nonparties such as victims. Section
III.C explains that courts would consider likelihood of success on the merits
based on evidence rather than mere proffers, and they would afford the defendant
some opportunity for discovery to contest the government's allegations on this
point. Before analyzing each component, Chart 2 demonstrates the comparison at
a glance.
205. Baradaran, supra note 27, at 725; see also BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 3 ("[S]ince the 1984
reform, pretrial detention has become the norm rather than the exception."); Shima Baradaran & Frank
L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 501 (2012) ("[I]n the last several years, national
pretrial detention rates have increased significantly without any scholarly comment and without a
determination of whether increased detention is reducing crime." (footnote omitted)).
206. Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 77, at 23.
207. Humphreys, supra note 28.
208. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 205, at 557-58.
209. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 82. This metric assumes, of course, that the defendant is released at
some point. It does not suggest hat defendants fail to appear while in pretrial detention.
210. See Grover Norquist, Conservatives for Criminal Justice Reform, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2017,
6:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/conservatives-for-criminal-justice-reform- 1506463970 [https://
perma.cc/B2C9-AU83] (detailing budget-driven conservative successes in criminal justice reform to
reduce prison populations by focusing on which offenders need to be incarcerated).
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CHART 2
Preliminary Current Pretrial Toward an Improved Pretrial
Injunctions Detention Detention Regime
Likelihood of Some unquantified like- Likelihood of irreparable harm-
irreparable harm lihood that he defend- serious risk that the defendant will:
ant will: (1) commit a crime that harms
(1) be accused of a someone while on pretrial
crime, however liberty or
minor or (2) abscond from the jurisdiction
(2) not appear for
proceedings
Equities balanced Harm to defendant and Balance:
her loved ones not (1) defendant-specific harms,
considered (2) non-defendant-specific harms,
(3) harms to nonparties like defend-
ant's loved ones; and
(4) jail defendant only when benefit
outweighs these combined
harms
Likelihood of Considered without Require government to introduce
success based on evidence evidence to demonstrate likelihood
evidence of success
A. IRREPARABLE HARM TO PUBLIC
A civil defendant will not be enjoined from behaving as it wishes before a court
resolves the merits of the case unless the plaintiff is able to establish that not
enjoining that activity will likely result in irreparable injury. By contrast, crimi-
nal law purports to care about presuming defendants innocent until proven guilty,
but the threshold for depriving a defendant of her liberty is far lower. The poten-
tial that an accused will forget about a court date or that an accused might later be
arrested for any crime-however minor or unfounded the allegations-is used to
justify physically restraining liberty through pretrial detention. That disparity is
unjustifiable; the criminal standard too should require likely irreparable harm
before incarcerating an accused.
The labels that criminal law now uses when analyzing the need for pretrial
detention-dangerousness and flight risk-sound like serious requirements
equivalent to irreparable injury. They aren't. Those labels are misleading.211 And
those misleading labels obscure important, unjustifiable discrepancies between
the civil and criminal systems regarding interim relief.
211. See infra Sections III.A.1-2.
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A criminal standard that more closely adheres to the civil one would require
not merely some likelihood of rearrest on any crime while on pretrial liberty or
some likelihood that the defendant might forget about her court date. Rather, like-
lihood of irreparable harm would mean likelihood of actual dangerousness or
actual flight risk-a far cry from the way those labels are now used.
Dangerousness should mean a substantial risk that the defendant will commit-
not merely be accused of-a violent crime while on pretrial liberty. Flight risk
should mean a serious risk that the defendant will abscond from the jurisdiction.
Either of those alone or a combination of the two could constitute likely irrepara-
ble injury to the public adequate to justify pretrial detention.2 12 But both would be
substantially more stringent than avoiding some modest possibility of rearrest
and nonappearance that purport to justify pretrial detention now.
1. Likelihood of Committing Future Crime as Irreparable Injury
The government could satisfy a likelihood of irreparable injury standard by demon-
strating a substantial risk that the defendant will seriously and unlawfully harm an
actual victim. That proposed standard departs from current practice in several ways.
First, it looks to actual commission of a crime rather than a mere arrest (although con-
viction will have to proxy for factual guilt). Second, it distinguishes based on the seri-
ousness of the offense as current doctrine and many risk predictors do not. Third,
serious thought should be given to what constitutes ufficient "likelihood" in this con-
text rather than reflexively deeming some arbitrary, unquantified likelihood as suffi-
cient or adhering to labels such as "high risk" that a risk-assessment tool provides.
Many court systems have begun to rely on data-driven measures of pretrial risk
of rearrest.213 The vast majority of these risk-assessment tools do not distinguish
between violent and nonviolent crime risks.214 Tools that separate out risk of rear-
rest on a violent charge from other risks therefore have more to recommend them
than tools that do not.2 15 But even the risk-assessment tools that distinguish vio-
lent from nonviolent crime risk place an accused into the "high risk" category for
rearrest on a violent crime at a strikingly low threshold. One tool deems an eight
percent risk of rearrest for a violent crime "high risk," and another places that
threshold at 8.6%.216
Estimating the likelihood that the defendant will commit a crime while on pre-
trial liberty based on likelihood of arrest rather than likelihood of conviction is
problematic because it hinges not on a finding of guilt but a mere accusation of
212. Cf. Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1152-59, 1158
& n.163 (2018) (creating a taxonomy of mixed-motive standards, one of which includes two
independently insufficient causes that are sufficient when combined).
213. E.g., Mayson, supra note 13, at 507-18 (explaining the newfound prevalence of algorithmic
pretrial-risk-assessment tools and categorizing their various features).
214. Id. at 511-12.
215. See id. The Public Safety Assessment-Court (PSA) tool developed by the Laura and John
Arnold Foundation is in use throughout Arizona, Kentucky, New Jersey, and several other jurisdictions
across the country. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 21, at 4.
216. Mayson, supra note 13, at 514.
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wrongdoing.2 1 7 And that accusation is levied by police officers via an arrest.21
The likelihood that a defendant will be rearrested depends on how heavily the
neighborhood where she lives is policed. That is a troubling idea when neighbor-
hood often proxies for race and class and when poorer and minority neighbor-
hoods tend to be more heavily policed than white affluent ones.219
With more precise terminology, an eight percent risk of rearrest for any crime-
the current standard for those classified as having high risk of dangerousness
under one popular tool-is a far cry from likelihood of irreparable harm. A
standard that actually required irreparable harm in the criminal context as to the
defendant's future conduct would require a substantial risk that the defendant
will be convicted of a future crime that injures a particular victim.2 20 The ideal
metric would count whether the defendant in fact will seriously unlawfully harm
someone. But because crime commission cannot be measured directly, likeli-
hood of either arrest or conviction could serve as a proxy. Both would be over-
and underinclusive. Arrest data will be overinclusive because it will sweep in
innocents,2 21 but so too will it be underinclusive because some guilty defendants
evade arrest. Criminal law's reasonable doubt burden is meant to make acquit-
ting the guilty more likely than convicting the innocent, and thus convictions can
be underinclusive. But so too can convictions be overinclusive as a proxy for
guilt.222 The vast majority of convictions follow guilty pleas223 where reasonable
217. See Roberts, supra note 161 (manuscript at 1-32) (arguing that arrests are often treated
practically and rhetorically as if they indicate guilt even though they are mere accusations).
218. That police officers and prosecutors are not detached and neutral actors is why prosecutions
without a grand jury indictment require a judicial finding of probable cause at an early stage to detain a
defendant. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1975).
219. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Elliott Ash, New Policing, New Segregation: From Ferguson to New
York, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 33, 39 (2017) ("After controlling for local crime rates, a neighborhood's
racial composition predicted the police response in terms of proactivity. In other words, proactivity was
about more than crime; it was also about race." (footnote omitted)); Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies,
Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
457, 462 (2000) ("[T]he implementation of Broken Windows policies [in New York City] was
disproportionately concentrated in minority neighborhoods and conflated with poverty and other signs
of socio-economic disadvantage.").
That rearrest while on pretrial liberty may pose a public-relations risk for the judge is not a sufficient
reason to rely on arrest data. See Gouldin, supra note 14, at 889 ("When judges release potentially
dangerous individuals who subsequently inflict harm, 'the error will be emblazoned across the front
pages .... (quoting David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and
War, 97 CALiF. L. REv. 693, 696 (2009))); Wiseman, supra note 17, at 417 ("[Judges] face the
possibility of public scorn (and for elected judges, lost votes) for releasing defendants who flee or
commit crimes."); Wiltz, supra note 4 (quoting a Minnesota judge: "The fear is I'm going to let
somebody go and they're going to go out and do something terrible.").
220. This Article's primary objective is conceptual; as such, defining the detailed contours of this
requirement are beyond its scope.
221. See Roberts, supra note 161 (manuscript at 3-32) (explaining that legal actors erroneously
equate arrests to guilt in many contexts).
222. Anna Roberts, Convictions as Guilt (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (manuscript
at 1-6).
223. See, e.g., Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 341
(2012) ("About 95 percent of felony convictions follow guilty pleas . . . ." (footnote omitted)); Murat C.
Mungan & Jonathan Klick, Identifying Criminals' Risk Preferences, 91 IND. L.J. 791, 816 (2016) ("It is
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doubt casts, at best, a narrow shadow on plea bargaining.224 For the rare cases
that go to trial, juries are fallible, and there are structural barriers to defendants
demonstrating their innocence.2 25 Because of the presumption of innocence in
the criminal system and concerns about discrimination in policing, relying on
conviction data in the pretrial detention inquiry is the better choice.226
Finally, pretrial detention law needs to think seriously about what quantity of
227future crime risk is sufficiently serious to warrant pretrial detention. Perhaps an
eight percent likelihood that the defendant would commit a serious crime that
harms many people should be enough to detain someone presumed innocent, but
that is not obvious.2 28 Maybe it should be forty percent. The threshold matters in
many cases: less than four percent of all defendants are more than twenty-six per-
cent likely to be rearrested while on pretrial liberty.229
Perhaps the nature of the accusations against the defendant should help cali-
brate what likelihood of future crime is sufficient to warrant pretrial detention. If
the allegations involve serious, violent crimes, a lesser probability of a future
occurrence might suffice because that would yield a similar expected cost.
Consider, for instance, someone arrested on a domestic violence charge caught
holding a knife over his spouse or someone found with a huge cache of weapons.
Whatever computer models may suggest, judges in those cases may sensibly find
likelihood of irreparable injury on a lower probability of a future offense than in a
drug possession case. And as a practical matter, it is hard to see any judge releas-
ing such a defendant. Where risk-assessment tools already account for the nature
of the pending charge, as several do,230 judges should not double count.
2. Flight Risk as Irreparable Injury
The risk that the defendant will abscond from justice to evade punishment
could also constitute irreparable harm to the public. But absconding from justice
often stated that over 90% of convictions in criminal cases in the United States are obtained through plea
bargains.").
224. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REv. 2464 (2004) (explaining many reasons that plea bargaining does not neatly fit the idea of both sides
bargaining in the shadow of trial and discounting by likelihood of victory).
225. See Roberts, supra note 222 (manuscript at 2-5) (explaining constraints on defense
representation such as lack of resources, large caseloads, and pretrial detention).
226. Conviction data also suffers from biases, but one can hope they are less pronounced than biases
in arrest data that lack any check on police discretion. Cf Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1975)
(requiring judicial finding of probable cause to detain a defendant who has not been indicted).
227. Mayson, supra note 13, at 559-60.
228. See id. at 560 ("[N]othing less than a substantial likelihood of serious violent crime within a six-
month span can justify onerous restraints on liberty.").
229. Baughman, supra note 36, at 13. There is a fair degree of uncertainty about the likelihood of the
future conviction, but so too is there uncertainty in preliminary injunction proceedings. See Davis, supra
note 190 (advocating an approach to preliminary injunctions that takes into account a court's level of
uncertainty); Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the Standard for Preliminary Relief, 70 U. CHI. L.
REv. 197 (2003) (advocating an approach that accounts for both courts' uncertainty about the estimate
of harm and prediction of the decision on the merits).
230. Mayson, supra note 13, at 512 (charting which risk-assessment tools account for the nature of
the charged offense in predicting risk).
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is not the same as the term "flight risk" that courts currently use quite loosely to
mean risk of nonappearance.2 31 When an accused misses a court date because she
must show up for work to avoid being fired, her absence is thought to count as
"flight." 23 2 This is so even though many statutes direct courts to consider the risk
of "nonappearance" rather than flight risk.2 3 3 None of the risk-assessment tools
analyze the real cause for concem-"flight risk"-but instead measure the
broader category of risk of nonappearance.234
A genuine flight risk where the defendant is likely to abscond from the jurisdic-
tion should, with sufficient proof, warrant pretrial detention to protect the court's
ability to enforce its judgment.2 35 It makes sense to call preventing operation of
the criminal process irreparable harm to the public that could justify incarcerating
someone who has not been convicted of a crime. But this genuine-flight-risk
standard should be as difficult to meet as is its civil counterpart. A preliminary
injunction to ensure that he court can enforce its judgment requires "a strong in-
dication" that the defendant will become insolvent before a judgment can be
collected.23 6
A defendant who forgets about her court date or misses a court date because of
a work conflict does not irreparably injure the public. These more modest prob-
lems in ensuring defendants' appearances can be solved in more modest ways
that do not require pretrial detention such as flexible scheduling for judicial pro-
ceedings and reminder calls and text messages.2 37 In sum, criminal law should
231. See Gouldin, supra note 27, at 687; supra Section III.A.1.
232. See Gouldin, supra note 27, at 687 ("[J]udges making bail determinations use the term 'flight
risk' to refer to all nonappearance risks, whether or not the individual is actually likely to flee the
jurisdiction. Scholars and reformers do the same." (footnotes omitted)).
233. Id. at 701; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012) (requiring judges to release defendants unless
"release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required"); D.C. CODE § 23-1322
(2013) ("The judicial officer shall hold a hearing to determine whether any condition or combination of
conditions set forth ... will reasonably assure the appearance of the person. . .
234. Gouldin, supra note 27, at 716-17; Mayson, supra note 13, at 509-10.
235. See Gouldin, supra note 27, at 724-25 (arguing that absconders from the jurisdiction are
different from those who deliberately do not appear but remain in the jurisdiction and from those whose
failure to appear is inadvertent).
236. E.g., Micro Signal Research, Inc. v. Otus, 417 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Surplec, Inc.
v. Me. Pub. Serv. Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 147 (D. Me. 2007) (denying a preliminary injunction when the
plaintiff demonstrated only the mere possibility that the defendant might have insufficient assets to
satisfy a monetary judgment); Sieren v. William R. Hague, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Wis. 1998)
(denying a preliminary injunction when the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendant firm would
not be able to pay its sales representatives).
237. See, e.g., WENDY F. WHITE, COURT HEARING CALL NOTIFICATION PROJECT 2 (2006), https://
community.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=34fdeae8-
c04e-a57d-9cca-e5a8d4460252 [https://perma.cc/5G93-ZL9R] (reporting a forty-nine percent decrease in
one Arizona county's failure-to-appear rate because of a phone-call reminder program); Mitchel N. Herian &
Brian H. Bornstein, Reducing Failure to Appear in Nebraska: A Field Study, 13 NEB. LAw. 11, 12 (2010)
("[R]eceiving any type of postcard reduced the [failure-to-appear] rate from 12.6% to 9.7%" and some forms
of the postcard reduced the rate even further); Timothy R. Schnacke et al., Increasing Court-Appearance
Rates and Other Benefits of Live-Caller Telephone Court-Date Reminders, 48 CT. REv. 86, 89, 92 (2012)
(finding that phone call reminders in one Colorado county led to forty-three percent fewer failures to appear
during the program's pilot phase and a fifty-two percent decrease in the program's first six months); Jason
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require the government to show likelihood of irreparable injury as a prerequisite
to detention; irreparable injury means genuine dangerousness, genuine flight risk,
or both.
B. BALANCING HARM TO THE DEFENDANT
If a plaintiff can demonstrate likely irreparable injury absent a preliminary
injunction, to minimize the probability of interim harm, preliminary injunction
analysis balances the harms that granting or denying interim relief would impose
on the parties and considers the interests of nonparties.238 Balancing all relevant
harms makes ense in the criminal context too for pretrial detention. Courts deter-
mining whether to preserve the defendant's liberty pending trial should explicitly
consider the harm that the defendant and her loved ones would suffer from pre-
trial detention and balance those harms against the benefits of detention.239
Without accounting for these important costs, courts will tend to overuse pretrial
detention as they do now.240
Whether and how pretrial detention would harm the defendant is now absent
from the pretrial detention analysis.24 1 Courts do not consider the ways in which
incarceration harms defendants generally, and they do not consider the ways in
which some defendants are particularly harmed by immediate pretrial incarcera-
tion. Courts do not, for instance, evaluate whether detention will cost a defendant
her job, housing, or custody of her children, nor do they consider the harm those
Tashea, Text-Message Reminders Are a Cheap and Effective Way to Reduce Pretrial Detention, ABA J.
(July 17, 2018, 7:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article/text~messages_can keep
people-out of-jail/ [https://perma.cc/JN7W-DXJF] (recounting study results indicating that text-message
reminders lower failure-to-appear rates).
Manhattan has piloted a project to add evening court hours that will be scaled up if successful. Mayor
de Blasio and Chief Judge Lippman Announce Justice Reboot, an Initiative to Modernize the Criminal
Justice System, N.Y.C. (Apr. 14, 2015), http://wwwl.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/235-15/mayor-
de-blasio-chief-judge-lippman-justice-reboot-initiative-modernize-the [https://perma.cc/5NPP-6SL9].
238. E.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
239. See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 36, at 202, 214 (proposing "[i]ncorporating cost-benefit
analysis more directly into statutory bail reform" so that serious costs of pretrial detention for defendants
and nonparties are "balanced carefully against the benefits of reducing the risk of flight and future
crimes"); Yang, supra note 27, at 1416, 1469-70 (arguing that courts now consider only benefits of
pretrial detention and that considering costs would increase social welfare); see also United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (conceiving of pretrial detention as categorically balancing the
government's regulatory interest in safety and the individual's liberty interests); cf. Roberts, supra note
73, at 341, 371-75 (explaining that courts already use cost-benefit analysis, including accounting for the
opportunity costs of particular prosecutions when dismissing cases in furtherance of the interests of
justice or as de minimis). The preliminary injunction standard too accounts for interests of nonparties.
Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
240. See Yang, supra note 27, at 1404 (explaining that failing to account for costs in pretrial
detention has led to loss of social welfare).
241. Id.; cf. Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 342
(2004) ("In criminal law, prosecution of offenders has obvious and vivid benefits, but its costs are
diffuse, externalized, and largely off-screen."). Baughman recognizes the costs that detention inflicts on
defendants and their loved ones but does not ask courts to account for them directly. Baughman, supra
note 36, at 4-6; see also BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 82-91 (detailing the costs of pretrial detention to
defendants and their families).
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outcomes might inflict on the defendant's family.2 42 Neither do they consider
whether pretrial detention will lead to job loss for years to come.243 Many pretrial
detention statutes require courts to consider characteristics of the defendant, but
they do so to analyze likelihood of nonappearance or rearrest rather than to con-
sider the costs of pretrial detention to the defendant, her family, or the commu-
nity.244 Under federal law, for instance, courts should consider "family ties,
employment, [and] financial resources."2 45 But courts are asking those questions
only to discern likelihood of appearance based on connections to the community
and ability to pay bail. If the defendant has a family, she is thought less likely to
flee. So too if the defendant has a job.
To the extent that current law accounts for the interests of defendants in avoid-
ing pretrial detention, it does so through a generalized notion that incarceration is
bad and therefore that pretrial liberty or an unsecured bond should be the default
resolutions to the pretrial detention question.2 46 Those defaults are sensible, but
submerging the defendant's interests into the background while focusing case-
specific attention on the government's interests poses two problems. First, such
an approach fails to account for the particularized ways that pretrial detention
harms some defendants because of their individual circumstances. Second, it
advantages the government's interests in detention over the defendant's interests
in avoiding detention by increasing the salience of the former but not the latter; it
thus likely causes courts to undervalue how pretrial detention harms all defend-
ants.247 Let us consider each in turn.
1. Defendant-Specific Harms
Minimizing harm of an erroneous interim ruling would require judges to con-
sider the interests of actual defendants and the likely costs of ordering them
detained before deciding to detain someone who has not been convicted of a
crime.248 For some defendants, immediate incarceration will mean missing work,
242. See Harris & Paul, supra note 20 (expressing concern about these overlooked costs).
243. See Dobbie et al., supra note 58, at 227 (finding that detained defendants are significantly less
likely to have any household income for four years after their bail hearing than nondetained defendants).
244. Cf. Roberts, supra note 73, at 371-72 (explaining that when dismissing in furtherance of justice
courts consider costs to the defendant, her family, and nonparties as well as opportunity costs of the
prosecution).
245. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) (2012).
246. See, e.g., id. § 3142(b) (establishing these defaults). ABA standards suggest similar defaults.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 89, § 10-1.1, at 36 ("The law favors the release of
defendants pending adjudication of charges."); id. § 10-5.1(a), at 14 ("It should be presumed that
defendants are entitled to release on personal recognizance. . .").
247. Defendant-specific harms versus non-defendant-specific harms is not the only way to categorize
these overlooked costs. See Yang, supra note 27, at 1417-29 (describing five categories of private and
social costs of pretrial detention).
248. The Supreme Court has recognized the important consequences that pretrial detention may
impose on defendants. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) ("Pretrial confinement may imperil
the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships."); Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972) ("The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on
the individual. It often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness. . . . Moreover,
if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or
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which will financially harm families who may rely on that defendant for sup-
port.249 Missing work may mean that defendants lose their jobs.250 Over the long
term, serving time reduces hourly wages for men by eleven percent and annual
earnings by forty percent.251 For some, being detained may mean losing custody
of a child.25 2 Or detention may mean missing important life events.25 And even
after release, these financial consequences may mean missed rent payments or
car insurance payments.254 These sorts of stories have been well documented in
mainstream media recently, and some of those stories were recounted in the
Introduction to this Article. Indeed, numerous current and former prosecutors
have recently articulated these concerns in amicus briefs that side with criminal
defendants.255 Compounding the problems, every jurisdiction in the country can
order defendants to pay costs related to their defense, and the inability to pay that
recoupment debt can limit employment, housing, and public benefits and lead to
further arrest, probation revocation, and incarceration.2 56
otherwise prepare his defense."); see also, e.g., Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 36, at 202 (discussing
serious harm to defendants and others from pretrial detention).
249. E.g., Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J.
1344, 1356 (2014); Dewan, supra note 26; see also BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 89 (recounting study
showing that families' incomes fell by twenty-two percent while a family member was incarcerated and
remained fifteen percent lower in the year after release); Shima Baradaran Baughman, The History of
Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U. L. REV. 837, 872 (2018) (describing costs of pretrial detention to those
accused of misdemeanors as similar to those accused of felonies including employment, housing, and
sometimes children and family stability).
250. E.g., Simonson, supra note 1, at 599; Wiseman, supra note 249, at 1356; Dewan, supra note 26;
see also Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/
magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/9W63-GCWU] (quoting a criminal defense lawyer:
"Most of our clients are people who have crawled their way up from poverty or are in the throes of
poverty ... . Our clients work in service-level positions where if you're gone for a day, you lose your
job.... People who live in shelters, where if they miss their curfews, they lose their housing.").
251. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 86; see also PEW CHARITABLE TRS., COLLATERAL COSTS:
INCARCERATION'S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 11 (2010), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/
legacy/uploadedfiles/pcsassets/2010/collateralcosts lpdf.pdf.
252. E.g., Simonson, supra note 1, at 589; Dewan, supra note 26.
253. See, e.g., Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 2016) ("Unable to post his bail, Curry
was sent to jail and waited there for months for his case to proceed. While imprisoned, he missed the
birth of his only child, lost his job, and feared losing his home and vehicle."); Romer & Rose, supra note
6 (recounting the story of Mustafa Willis who missed his cousin's funeral, among other consequences,
because he was detained pretrial for a crime he did not commit).
254. Simonson, supra note 1, at 589; Wiseman, supra note 249, at 1357.
255. See Humphrey, Current and Former Prosecutors' Brief, supra note 180, at 8 ("[D]etention
before trial, even briefly, can result in the loss of employment, shelter, government assistance,
education, and child custody. An individual detained in jail-even though still presumed innocent-
may be unable to access necessary mental-health and medical treatment, including drug therapy."); Brief of
Amici Curiae Current and Former Dist. and State's Attorneys, State Attorneys Gen., U.S. Attorneys,
Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and Dep't of Justice Officials, in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 7, ODonnell v.
Harris County, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-20333), ECF No. 130 [hereinafter ODonnell, Current
and Former Prosecutors' Brief] ("As prosecutors, amici know that detention of a misdemeanor defendant
before trial may result in loss of employment, shelter, education, and even child custody.").
256. Beth A. Colgan, Paying for Gideon, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1931-39 & nA (2014); John D.
King, Privatizing Criminal Procedure, 107 GEO. L.J. 561 (2019) (discussing the practice of surcharging
defendants who exercise their constitutional rights).
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The types of harms at issue here-such as loss of employment, custody of a
child, or housing-will also necessarily impose costs on defendants' loved ones
if they depend on the defendant for support, care, or a roof over their heads.257
For some, the lost paychecks may simply mean tightening the budget for the du-
ration of detention. But for many defendants' families who live paycheck to pay-
check, a single missed check could mean hunger or even homelessness. It is hard
to see why those costs to persons not even accused of a crime should be over-
looked when seeking to minimize harm of an erroneous interim ruling. And
beyond the harms that he defendant's family will face while she is incarcerated,
that pretrial detention is criminogenic means that the risk of defendants' families
being harmed later also increases if the defendant is detained now.258
For defendants' children, the story gets worse. "[C]hildren with incarcerated
parents are more likely to . . . engage in future criminal activity themselves."2 59
Since 1991, "[t]he number of children with an incarcerated parent has increased
by almost 80 percent."260 "[A]t least one in three children in contact with the child
welfare system has had a primary caregiver arrested."2 6 1 One study found that pa-
rental incarceration was worse than divorce when measuring ADD or ADHD,
children's behavioral or conduct problems, and developmental delays;262 incar-
ceration of a parent is even worse than death of a parent when measuring ADD or
ADHD.263
To be clear, considering the harms of detention on defendants and their loved
ones does not mean that defendants should never be forced to bear the cost of los-
ing their jobs, families, or housing following arrest.2 6 4 Nor even does it suggest
257. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 78 (explaining and seeking to quantify the harms that pretrial
detention of parents imposes on children).
258. See CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN COSTS
OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 19 (2013), https://www.amoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/
LJAFReport_hidden-costsFNL.pdf (finding that "[d]efendants detained pretrial were 1.3 times more
likely to recidivate compared to defendants who were released at some point pending trial" and that "the
longer an individual stays in pretrial detention, the higher the likelihood of [recidivism]"); Gupta et al.,
supra note 129, at 494-96 (finding that money bail increases the likelihood of recidivism by nine percent
based on data from Philadelphia and Pittsburgh); Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 58, at 759-
68, 794 (finding based on regression analysis of data from Harris County, Texas that those who were
detained pretrial had a thirty-one percent increase in felonies within eighteen months after their bail
hearing and a twenty-two percent increase in misdemeanor crime within a year after their bail hearing).
259. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 88.
260. Id.; ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., WHEN A PARENT IS INCARCERATED: A PRIMER FOR SOCIAL
WORKERS 2 (2011), https://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-WhenAParentlslncarceratedPrimer-
201 1.pdf.
261. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 88.
262. Kristin Turney, Stress Proliferation Across Generations? Examining the Relationship Between
Parental Incarceration and Childhood Health, 55 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 302, 311-14 (2014).
263. Id.
264. Considering the interests of nonparties when deciding on pretrial liberty or detention is not
foreign to criminal law. Victims' interests already factor into such decisions. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771(a)
(1), (a)(4) (2012) (providing victims "[t]he right to be reasonably protected from the accused" and "[t]he
right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release"); see also 4
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 126, § 12.1(f), at 19 (explaining that two-thirds of state constitutions
recognize a right for the victim to be heard at a public proceeding involving pretrial liberty).
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that defendants should never feel additional pressure to plead guilty because they
are locked up before trial. It means that these hefty costs should be imposed only
when their offsetting benefits justify doing so.2 6 5
If judges accounted for the potential loss of employment, housing, custody, or
other defendant-specific costs, the pretrial detention question would privilege
people who have children or employment over those who do not but are otherwise
similarly situated. It might seem strange that these factors which have no bearing
on the defendant's culpability or deserts would affect whether she is detained
pending trial. We typically think that defendants who have committed similar
crimes warrant similar treatment. But proportionality is a punishment principle,
and pretrial detention is purportedly not punishment, says the Supreme Court.266
Thus, it makes sense to allow courts to view each defendant's harm of incarcera-
tion differently based on her circumstances, just as courts do when assessing the
benefits of detention through defendants' individualized risk.267
2. Non-Defendant-Specific Harms
Even setting aside the defendant-specific harms just discussed, pretrial deten-
tion harms all defendants, and courts should account for and articulate these
harms and then decide whether they are worth inflicting in each case.268
For defendants generally, pretrial detention (1) increases the likelihood of convic-
tion, (2) increases sentence l ngth, (3) subjects them to awful jail conditions, and
(4) increases their future criminality while reducing their risk of appearance for
court proceedings.
Defendants who are initially released before trial are twenty-four percent less
likely to be convicted than those initially detained, according to a recent study.2 69
For alleged misdemeanants, one recent study found that pretrial detention is asso-
ciated with a twenty-five percent increase in the likelihood of conviction.270
Misdemeanants are also forty-three percent more likely to be sentenced to jail
if they are detained pretrial and receive sentences that are more than double that
of defendants who were not detained, according to that study.271 In the federal
system, pretrial release reduces defendants' sentence length by sixty-seven
265. Cf. Baughman, supra note 36, at 10 (arguing that a better pretrial detention system that detained
fewer people would have saved $78 billion over the past decade, accounting for costs imposed on
society of reoffending or failures to appear while on pretrial liberty). Indeed, even a policy of universal
pretrial liberty would save money over the current regime using a similar calculus. Id. at 21.
266. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (reasoning that pretrial detention is not
punishment and that it therefore can be consistent with due process). But see Roberts, supra note 73, at
372 n.333 (collecting cases that refer to pre-adjudication harm as "punishment").
267. See Yang, supra note 27, at 1440 (arguing that considering individualized costs to defendants is
the logical extension of individualized risk).
268. See Humphrey, Current and Former Prosecutors' Brief, supra note 180, at 8-9 (explaining that
detained defendants have "a greater likelihood of conviction and a greater likelihood of longer sentences
compared to those who are released").
269. Dobbie et al., supra note 58, at 225.
270. Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 58, at 744.
271. Id. at 747.
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percent, another study found.272 For alleged felons, one study found that pretrial
detention leads to a forty-two percent increase in the maximum days of an incar-
ceration sentence-or 124 days-and a 136-day increase in the number of days
before parole eligibility. 273 Let us unpack why pretrial detention increases likeli-
hood of conviction and sentence length.
Pretrial detention makes defendants more likely to plead guilty.274 The effect is
particularly pronounced for alleged misdemeanants who may face the choice of
going home on a time-served sentence if they plead guilty or staying in jail to
await trial.275 Shima Baradaran Baughman's book tells the story of Raul
Hernandez, who was charged for drug possession after dropping an empty plastic
bag containing heroin residue.276 Hernandez could not make his $500 bail; after
nine days in jail, when the police officer was unavailable to testify at a hearing
Hernandez pleaded guilty to get out of jail instead of awaiting further delays from
behind bars.277 This decisionmaking is hurried for defendants itching to get home
and out of terrible jail conditions, which in turn jeopardizes "extended discus-
sions with counsel, case investigation, or discovery from the prosecution."278 For
defendants who refuse to plead guilty and opt to contest the charges against them,
it is more difficult to mount a defense from behind bars. Pretrial detention may
also yield longer sentences to the extent that it causes job loss because lack of
employment removes a potential mitigating factor at sentencing.2 79
Moreover, jail conditions are awful,280 and incarceration can inflict significant
physical and psychological harm.281 The psychological harm from imprisonment
is sometimes extreme, such as in the case of Kalief Browder, who died by suicide
272. Stephanie Holmes Didwania, The Immediate Consequences of Pretrial Detention: Evidence
from Federal Criminal Cases 30 (Feb. 17, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2809818 [https://perma.cc/D8W4-MZPB].
273. Stevenson, supra note 84, at 20.
274. Dobbie et al., supra note 58, at 203; Gouldin, supra note 14, at 860; Mayson, supra note 13, at
556; Simonson, supra note 1, at 609.
275. ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1107 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (finding that the
evidence "overwhelmingly prove[d] that thousands of misdemeanor defendants each year are
voluntarily pleading guilty knowing that they are choosing a conviction with fast release over exercising
their right to trial at the cost of prolonged detention"); ODonnell, Current and Former Prosecutors'
Brief, supra note 255, at 7 ("[T]he accused may see an early guilty plea as the most expedient way to
obtain release, as many misdemeanor defendants are sentenced to time served. This in turn may result in
the conviction of innocent people.. . ."); Wiseman, supra note 249, at 1356 ("In some cases, the periods
that defendants spend in jail awaiting trial is comparable to, or even greater than, their potential
sentences, thus substantially incentivizing quick plea deals regardless of guilt or innocence." (footnote
omitted) (citing Bibas, supra note 224, at 2492)); Frontline: The Plea (PBS television broadcast June 17,
2004), http://video.pbs.org/video/2216784391/ [https://perma.cc/A8Q9-7BTQ] (explaining the pressures
faced by even innocent defendants to plead guilty when the sentence would result in immediate release from
jail).
276. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 85.
277. Id.
278. Simonson, supra note 1, at 589.
279. Yang, supra note 27, at 1419.
280. E.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 6.
281. See Fares & Levinson, supra note 9.
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after being wrongfully incarcerated on New York's Rikers Island.282 Sandra
Bland too provides a well-known example of someone who, it appears, took her
own life while in pretrial detention.283
Pretrial detention also causes ystemic harm that thwarts the ostensible objec-
tives of bail and pretrial detention. Pretrial detention makes the defendant more
likely to commit a future crime284 and makes defendants less likely to appear for
their legal proceedings.28 5
To minimize the harm of an erroneous interim ruling, even in cases without de-
fendant-specific harms, judges should articulate the harms of pretrial detention
that befall jailed arrestees generally.
Incorporating harms to the defendant into the pretrial detention analysis and
balancing them against the likely harm to the public if the defendant is afforded
pretrial liberty helps the judicial system reach a more efficient outcome whereby
defendants are detained pretrial only when detention yields more benefit than
cost.28 6 Courts should explicitly consider these very serious costs that remain
largely hidden in the pretrial detention inquiry to equalize the salience of costs
and benefits of detention.287 In the criminal law context, employment, marital
attachment, costs to families, and costs to communities are precisely the sorts of
costs that criminal law is likely to overlook without cost-benefit analysis.28 8 Cost-
benefit analysis provides a formalized structure that helps eliminate cognitive
shortcuts and provides a checklist of sorts to help prevent overlooking costs or
benefits.289 Moreover, that judges announce reasoning to support whichever deci-
sion they reach and that they have to articulate these harms to the defendant may
282. Gonnerman, supra note 8.
283. Wiltz, supra note 4. These are, unfortunately, far from the only examples. See, e.g., Fares &
Levinson, supra note 9 (providing more examples of defendants who died in Louisiana jails); Nick Wing,
A Black Teen Died This Week in an Alabama Jail Cell, and Authorities Say it Was Suicide, HUFFINGTON
PosT (July 24, 2015, 8:50 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/kindra-chapman-deathus
55a9063fe4b04740a3dfa844 [https://perma.cc/VD9P-LTYU] (discussing an eighteen-year-old who
died about an hour after being booked in pretrial detention).
284. See, e.g., LOWENKAMP ET AL., supra note 258, at 19; Gupta et al., supra note 129, at 495;
Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 58, at 762; Simonson, supra note 1, at 619 n.176.
285. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 82 (recounting findings that "[d]efendants held for 2-3 days were
22 percent more likely to fail to appear in court than similarly situated defendants who were held for less than
24 hours" and that "[d]efendants held for 15-30 days" failed to appear forty-one percent of the time).
286. Cf. Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 91-112
(2011) (arguing for better flow of cost information in criminal prosecution to improve efficiency).
287. See generally Brown, supra note 241 (advocating additional uses of cost-benefit analysis in
criminal law); see also, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Behavioral Economics and the Law: Tax, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAw 599, 609 (Eyal Zamir & Doron
Teichman eds., 2014) ("Salience is key to many behavioral effects: individuals overreact to highly
salient matters, and underreact (or fail to react at all) to low-salient ones.").
288. Brown, supra note 241, at 345-49.
289. Id. at 343, 359; cf Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
1059, 1064-73 (2000) (discussing the cost-benefit analytical process in the context of regulation).
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also help de-bias their decisionmaking.290
That a judge would hear from the defendant (or her lawyer) and then be
required to articulate the defendant's interests in pretrial liberty helps prevent the
cost-benefit analysis here from becoming wholly rote as other aspects of criminal
law judging have.291 So too does it afford defendants a greater measure of partici-
pation and respect than they now receive.2 92 Focusing the judge on individualized
information about the defendant might improve judicial decisionmaking by
reducing the influence of stereotypes.293 From a procedural justice standpoint,
seeing defendants being treated as individuals rather than as entries on a bail
schedule could improve citizens' perceptions of the fairness of criminal proce-
dure law and thus aid crime control.294
For meaningful case-by-case analysis of the balance of harms, defendants need
both counsel and the right to be heard.2 95 Recall that bail hearings-especially
290. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social Check on the Fundamental Attribution
Error, 48 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 227, 233-34 (1985) (explaining that telling people in advance that they will
be held accountable for their decisions leads to better decisionmaking).
291. See Gold, supra note 39, at 714-17 (explaining that judicial approval of plea agreements is rote
and accordingly not particularly meaningful). An example of a checklist for structuring this inquiry
appears in the Appendix.
292. See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1449, 1450-51 (2005) (explaining that defendants are often silent in their own cases but that speaking in
court has dignitary and expressive benefits for defendants).
293. See, e.g., Wayne Chan & Gerald A. Mendelsohn, Disentangling Stereotype and Person Effects:
Do Social Stereotypes Bias Observer Judgment of Personality?, 44 J. RES. PERSONALITY 251, 255-56
(2010) (finding that providing individuating information to subjects made them far less likely to describe
a person based on stereotypes); Ziva Kunda & Paul Thagard, Forming Impressions from Stereotypes,
Traits, and Behaviors: A Parallel-Constraint-Satisfaction Theory, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 284, 291-92
(1996) (finding consistent with previous literature that individuating information about particular
behaviors dominates the effect of stereotypes when the individuating information is unambiguous).
294. Procedural justice scholarship suggests that improved perception of fairness improves crime
control efforts. See, e.g., Tom R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 161-62 (2006) (concluding
based on an empirical study "that legitimacy plays an important role in promoting compliance" with the
law and explaining that views about legitimacy of authority "are strongly connected to judgments of the
fairness of the procedures through which authorities make decisions"); see also Humphrey, Current and
Former Prosecutors' Brief, supra note 180, at 10-12 (explaining the way that unaffordable bail
undermines crime control and the role that perceptions of fairness play in advancing policing); Jeffrey
Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules that Encourage Defendants to
Testify, 76 U. CiN. L. REV. 851, 857 (2008) (explaining that a system in which the court does not hear
from the accused "appears unfair and dictatorial").
295. This suggestion to appoint counsel for bail hearings does not arise directly from the comparison
to preliminary injunctions because civil defendants have no constitutional right to counsel in such
proceedings. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (affording a right to counsel in "criminal prosecutions");
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) ("The pre-eminent
generalization that emerges from this Court's precedents on an indigent's right to appointed counsel is
that such a right has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he
loses the litigation."). Nonetheless, because many criminal defendants cannot afford to hire their own
counsel, see Appleman, supra note 179, at 1343, there is reason to think that appointing counsel would
make a substantial practical difference in courts' abilities to carefully balance harms in each case.
Because civil defendants typically have their own counsel-and corporate defendants must because they
cannot appear pro se, e.g., Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993)-this same need
for appointed counsel does not arise on the civil side for the procedure to work well.
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initial ones-can be exceptionally short, occur over videoconference rather than
in person, be conducted by a commissioner or other nonjudicial official for later
review by a judge, and are typically held without counsel present.2 96 This state of
affairs cannot accommodate a meaningful case-by-case inquiry akin to prelimi-
nary injunctions.297 Second, the defendant needs the opportunity to be heard
about the particularized harms that she would incur if she were detained.2 98 And
as with other important criminal proceedings, defendants should have counsel to
help them most effectively convey the relevant facts.299 As several scholars have
argued, slowing down pretrial detention hearings is also a worthwhile step to
improve deliberation.3 00
Affording more judicial process to the pretrial detention question opens these
important proceedings to the public in a more meaningful way. And in a system
where few cases go to trial and many cases are resolved through plea bargaining
that is invisible to the public,301 public nontrial proceedings are all the more
important.302 Open proceedings both provide a check on the exercise of prosecu-
torial power and serve the ideals of democratic self-governance.30 3 This opacity
critique is familiar to civil procedure scholars in the settlement and mandatory
296. See supra Section II.A.1.
297. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 19, at 26 (arguing for individual
hearings in which defendants are represented by counsel to determine whether they should be detained
before trial).
298. See Wiseman, supra note 17, at 446 (explaining that, in most pretrial detention hearings, "the
judge spends several minutes, if that, hearing a defendant's story").
299. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 202-03 (arguing that defendants should be afforded counsel at
bail hearings); Appleman, supra note 179, at 1343 ("As the vast majority of those detained without bail
are those who cannot afford counsel on their own, it is rare to see defense counsel appear at these
hearings. Accordingly, the prosecutor usually presents her reasons why the indicted offender should not
be granted bail, with no response by the defense, and the judge decides." (footnote omitted)); Douglas L.
Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8-13, 38-40, app. tbl.B at 55-58 (surveying the availability of counsel at initial bail
proceedings in state courts); id. at 21-37 (arguing that federal constitutional law warrants counsel at bail
hearings); Colbert et al., supra note 81, at 1731-36 (recounting the successful results of a law clinic
project to provide counsel to otherwise unrepresented efendants at bail hearings in Baltimore).
300. E.g., Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 77, at 32; see also Appleman, supra note 179, at 1368
(proposing a "bail jury" and arguing that such an entity would slow down decisions on pretrial detention,
which is beneficial).
301. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 911, 951 (2006) (discussing the opacity of plea bargaining); cf. Gold, supra note 39, at 722-49
(proposing more judicial involvement in substantively reviewing plea agreements in a public proceeding
with a written record).
In some jurisdictions, judges involve themselves in plea bargaining and do so in the courtroom on a
written record. Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining:
Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 338-56 (2016).
Such a process improves transparency and accountability. But there is no reason to think that is the
norm. Indeed, federal rules prohibit judicial involvement in plea bargaining. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 1(c)(1).
302. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2173, 2195-205 (2014) (explaining why the right to a public trial extends to nontrial proceedings).
303. Id. at 2195-202 (grounding the democratic accountability point in the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence).
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arbitration contexts.3 04 Lack of public access means that the public cannot know
whether its tribunals are meting out justice fairly and impartially.30 5
Having articulated these benefits of a more robust process that balances the
harms of pretrial detention against its benefits, let us return here to the potential
concern about volume differences between the two procedures: judges decide far
more requests for pretrial detention than motions for preliminary injunction, and
thus perhaps less process is simply a necessary prerequisite to avoid grinding the
criminal system to a halt. For instance, New Mexico's governor argued for the
repeal of her state's recent bail reform because some judges were holding "mini-
trials" to decide whether to detain a defendant.306 But there are a number of prob-
lems with this volume objection: (1) affording counsel to defendants and provid-
ing them the opportunity to articulate the harms of detention may save the
government money on balance because it could mean detaining fewer defendants
pre- and post-trial; (2) prosecutors control how many cases to charge and in how
many cases to seek pretrial detention and thus could simply put this process into
action less frequently; and (3) if prosecutors end up too tightly constrained by
existing budget constraints and added process, that could spark an important po-
litical conversation about increasing the budget. Let us take these in turn.
First, affording counsel should mean less detention.3 07 One study found that
defendants who are represented by counsel are 2.5 times more likely to be
released on recognizance than if they were not represented.30 8 Detaining fewer
defendants pretrial would, most immediately, save money on jails. Some of those
savings could come from simply not spending money on cases that prosecutors
304. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 48, at 1085-87 (explaining how settlement prizes peace over justice
by undermining courts' law-declaring function); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the
Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L. J. 2804, 2811
(2015) (explaining that arbitration "strips the public of its rights of audience to observe state-empowered
decision makers imposing legally binding decisions").
305. Resnik, supra note 304, at 2816-17.
306. Dan McKay & Maggie Shepard, Gov. Martinez Calls for Repeal of Bail Reform Amendment,
LAS CRUCES SUN NEws (Oct. 18, 2017, 11:55 AM), http://www.Icsun-news.com/story/news/local/new-
mexico/2017/10/18/gov-martinez-calls-repeal-bail-reform-amendment/776475001/ [https://perma.cc/
3ULJ-KSCZ].
307. The Pre-Trial Advocates program of the Philadelphia Public Defender's Office provides counsel
to defendants before bail hearings and has reduced-or, in some cases, eliminated-defendants' time in
pretrial detention. See Janet Moore, Tipping the Outhouse or Storming the Mansionhouse?: New Trends
in Securing Early Access to Criminal Defense Counsel 17-18 (June 12, 2018) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author) (citing an interview with representatives of the public defender's office).
Law clinic students in Baltimore watched judges decline to change the initial bail set in eighty-five to
ninety percent of their cases before the students got involved. Colbert et al., supra note 81, at 1735-36.
After they got involved, seventy percent of their clients were afforded pretrial liberty, either on
recognizance or because the court reduced bail to an affordable amount. Id. Even had these been
publicly funded lawyers, this reduction in detention costs would seem to more than offset he cost of
counsel.
308. Id. at 1753.
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will ultimately decline in any event.30 9 That jails are criminogenic and thus
impose societal costs-not only of dollars to fund jails in the short term but also
of future crime-makes the cost-saving calculus more complex but suggests that
more process will yield less pretrial detention and less postconviction incarcera-
tion over the longer term.310
Because pretrial detention i creases the likelihood of conviction, less pretrial
detention will tend to mean fewer convictions and therefore less money spent on
prisons. For defendants who are not detained pretrial but are convicted nonethe-
less, the resulting postconviction sentences will tend to be shorter and thus
cheaper than they would have been for a detained defendant.311
On the other hand, that less pretrial detention would entail fewer defendants
pleading guilty might mean more prosecutor resources expended on each case.
Thus, the direction that more robust process would move spending is not clear in
the abstract. It is clear that saving money is incredibly important in criminal law
reform,3 12 and there is plenty of money to be saved in pretrial detention. The cur-
rent bail system costs about $14 billion per year,313 and a more robust cost-benefit
analysis that goes beyond the mere expenditure of dollars calculates that pretrial
detention reform could save $78 billion.314
Second, it bears remembering that prosecutors control the spigot. They can
charge fewer cases or decline to seek pretrial detention in all or nearly all cases of
a certain type such as nonviolent misdemeanors.315 Or prosecutors can get more
involved in prearrest screening to obviate the need for pretrial detention in some
cases.316 Likewise, prebooking diversion programs or citations instead of custo-
dial arrests would also reduce the need for judicial determinations regarding pre-
trial detention.3 17
309. See, e.g., REAVES, supra note 15, at 24 tbl.21 (indicating that prosecutors dismiss about twenty-
five percent of felony charges with no conviction entered); Gershowitz, supra note 25 (manuscript at 2
n.4) (suggesting that including misdemeanors would increase the percentage of felony charges
dismissed without conviction); Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66
STAN. L. REV. 611, 645 (2014) (finding that prosecutors in New York City decline to prosecute between
17,000 and 30,500 misdemeanor arrests each year).
310. E.g., LOWENKAMP ET AL., supra note 258, at 19; Gupta et al., supra note 129, at 494-96;
Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 58, at 759-68, 794.
311. E.g., LOWENKAMP ET AL., supra note 198, at 4; Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 58, at
747.
312. See Norquist, supra note 210 (discussing the focus among conservative lawmakers on reducing
costs in criminal law and their law-reform successes).
313. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE: How MUCH DOES IT COST? 2 (2017), https://university.
pretrial.org/viewdocument/pretrial-justice-how-much-does-it [h tps://perma.cc/W8E8-8KEJ].
314. Baughman, supra note 36, at 10 (calculating these savings over a decade).
315. See Tolan, supra note 171 (arguing that prosecutors can and should seek to have money bail set
less frequently and pointing to Houston and Chicago as places where prosecutors have recently made
promising reforms in this way). At year-end 2016, there were 178,800 people detained pretrial who were
charged with only misdemeanors. ZENG, supra note 1, at 9.
316. See Gershowitz, supra note 25 (manuscript at 33-35) (advocating such an approach for all
warrantless arrests in large and medium-sized counties).
317. See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 21, at 1-2 (describing prebooking diversion efforts in
various cities); see also Rebecca Pirius, Citation in Lieu ofArrest, NAT'L CONE. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov.
2019] 549
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JouRNAL
Concern that too much process would not allow the government to prosecute
as much crime as it wishes gets the relevant questions exactly backwards. For
considering how much process to afford, we should not start with an assumption
that X number of people need to be charged with crimes or that we can calculate
some socially optimal level of prosecutions from which we then determine how
much procedure allows the government to hit that enforcement target. Rather, we
should weigh error costs.3 18 Making the criminal process too cheap enables prose-
cutors to file more cases than they could if process were more extensive and ex-
pensive.319 That we have too many people incarcerated and too many criminal
cases in the United States-which is conceivably debatable in its own right-
does not necessarily mean that criminal process is too cheap. But I think it is.
Sixty seconds for a defendant to justify why she should not be incarcerated on a
mere accusation of wrongdoing and without any opportunity to explain the severe
harm that detention could cause seems like far too little process in a free society
that purports to presume the accused innocent. That pretrial detention encourages
defendants to waive their constitutional rights and accept incarceration no matter
whether they violated the law so that they can get home sooner than if they
remained in jail pending trial is even more troubling.
Third, if indeed more process were unattainable given current budget con-
straints to reach the caseload that prosecutors think would serve their minister-of-
justice duty,320 then politicians and relevant stakeholders could have an important
conversation about whether to increase the budget.321 Although prosecutor organ-
izations are typically an important and influential lobbying force and might
secure a larger appropriation without too much difficulty,3 22 fiscal pressures
would at least make this a non-obvious outcome. Perhaps prosecutors would
1, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/citation-in-lieu-of-arrest.aspx#fiftyState
[https://perma.cc/MX6P-UF6Y] (charting each state's laws regarding citation in lieu of custodial
arrest).
318. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341-48 (1976) (setting up a balancing test regarding
error costs to determine procedural due process).
319. See Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV.
183 (2014) (arguing that increased efficiency in criminal law can be perverse insofar as it enables more
prosecutions); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055,
1059, 1094-98 (2015) (describing decriminalization of misdemeanors as "the next generation of the
'net-widening' phenomenon"). I do not seek to defend here that there are too many prosecutions or that
criminal process is too cheap, though elsewhere I unify several strands of criminal law literature that
support this theme of making criminal law too cheap. Gold, supra note 183.
320. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (Am. BAR Ass'N 2004) (articulating the
minister-of-justice responsibility).
321. New Mexico seems to have somewhat bipartisan consensus on the need for greater funding to
support its bail reforms. See Femanda Lopez, Lawmakers Talk Solutions to "Bail Reform" Constitutional
Amendment Problem, KRQE (Oct. 27, 2017, 12:56 PM), http://krqe.com/2017/10/27/legislative-criminal-
justice-subcommittee-discusses-bail-reform-friday/ [https://perma.cc/M33A-2RDX].
322. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 728-29 (2005) (describing
prosecutors as "one of the most-if not the most-powerful lobbying groups in criminal law"); William
J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 534 (2001) (explaining
that the "natural alliance" of prosecutors' and legislators' interests "should make prosecutors (along
with police) a very powerful lobby on criminal law issues").
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instead be pressed to better prioritize their use of existing resources. And even a
conversation that yields greater esources for prosecutors at least increases the po-
litical salience of pretrial detention's excesses.
To the extent that cost is a significant concern, a more robust pretrial detention
inquiry can be systematized to keep it manageable. The Appendix provides a
checklist that judges could follow to ensure that hey consider each relevant fac-
tor without unnecessary delay. Lastly, if this more robust process-even as
streamlined in the Appendix-becomes debilitating, initial determinations could
be made more quickly with this more robust process to follow a few days later for
only those who remain incarcerated.3 23
Others might worry that advocating for defense counsel at additional proceed-
ings and arguing that counsel should have access to discovery to prepare a mean-
ingful argument faces practical difficulties in the large number of cases where
defendants are represented by public defenders. Caseloads in many public de-
fender offices are already extremely high and perhaps unconstitutionally so.3 24
Thus, simply asking lawyers to do more in each case is not a good answer.
Additional funding for public defender's offices would be necessary for the pre-
trial detention system proposed here to function. It may be that increasing public
defender budgets in some jurisdictions is a political nonstarter even if such an
increase would yield overall savings to the government. Fortunately, at least a
few states require increase to public defender funding when legislatures increase
prosecutor funding.3 25 Absent automatic statutory increases that accompany
increased prosecutor funding, improving funding might require a judicial finding
323. Cf. Manns, supra note 63, at 1952 (arguing that Takings Clause analysis should apply to pretrial
detention of more than forty-eight hours).
324. See Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Systematizing Public Defender Rationing, 93 DENV. L. REV. 389,
394 (2016) ("According to national guidelines, public defenders should only handle '150 felonies; 400
misdemeanors; 200 juvenile [delinquency matters]; 200 mental health cases; or 25 appeals' each
calendar year. In the nation's largest 100 counties, public defenders routinely handle an average of 530
cases annually, which can consist of cases exclusive to one genre or a mixed caseload. This finding
means that, on average, even if a defender works every single day without taking breaks for weekends or
holidays, that defender cannot devote even one full day each year exclusively to each case on her
docket." (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)); see also Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The
Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045-46 (2006)
(describing "compelling evidence of a true constitutional crisis" surrounding "the defense function for
poor people" in the U.S. criminal justice system being "drastically underfinanced"); Tina Peng, Opinion,
I'm a Public Defender. It's Impossible for Me to Do a Good Job Representing My Clients, WASH. PosT
(Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-public-defender-system-isnt-just-broken-
its-unconstitutional/201 5/09/03/aadf2b6c-5 19b- 1 1e5-98 12-92d5948a40f8_story.html [https://perma.
cc/FT47-88DJ] ("[T]he constitutional guarantee of effective representation for all has fallen short.
The funding crisis is nationwide, and it is dire.").
325. Tennessee statutorily links public defender funding to prosecutor funding, and thus a funding
increase for prosecutors' offices would require the same for public defenders. See, e.g., TENN. CODE
ANN. § 16-2-518 (2016) (providing that public defender's offices receive an increase of seventy-five
cents for each dollar that the district attorney receives in additional funding in the same county). Other
states do so at least with regard to salaries. Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel
and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REv. 219, 232-33 (2004) (cataloging states that
statutorily require salary parity between prosecutors and public defenders and noting that this parity
occurs in practice in some localities).
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that current funding systems are so deficient that they violate the constitutional
right to counsel.326
Thus far this Article has discussed balancing harms between releasing or detain-
ing a defendant. And if a defendant is either detained without bail or cannot make
bail, that liberty interest is the correct one to consider on the defendant's side of the
ledger. If a defendant can make bail, the relevant harm to the defendant and her
loved ones would be not her loss of liberty but rather her loss of property paying a
bail bondsman.327 This Article takes no position on whether affordable secured
money bail would be preferable to a binary system of detain or afford liberty.3 28 It
does, however, seem unlikely that affordable bail can exist for some defendants.329
C. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS
As part of minimizing probable interim harm, civil plaintiffs must show,
among the other points already discussed, that they are "likely to succeed on the
merits."330 In so requiring, courts seek to avoid awarding a party the relief she
seeks before judgment, only to later rule that she is not entitled to that relief.
Thus, to secure such extraordinary relief, plaintiffs in preliminary injunction pro-
ceedings must provide evidence to support their likelihood of success on the
326. See, e.g., Yarls v. Bunton, 231 F. Supp. 3d 128, 129 (M.D. La. 2017) (abstaining from ruling
on a case arguing that New Orleans's public defender funding crisis creates waiting lists that deny
defendants the right to counsel while describing "a state system, that, according to all parties to this
dispute, is broken"); Order Granting Motion for Class Certification at 4-5, 27, Tucker v. State, No.
CV-OC-2015-10240 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.acluidaho.org/sites/default/files/
fielddocuments/tuckerv_idaho_ordergrantingsclasscertification_2018-01-17.pdf (granting class
certification for claims that Idaho's public defender system is so underfunded that it deprives
defendants of their right to counsel).
327. With commercial bail bonds, the property deprivation would be ten percent of the bail
amount-the typical fee for commercial bondsmen. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 40. If the court were
to directly accept a ten percent deposit on the bail amount that it would return when the defendant
appears for further legal proceedings, then the interest at stake would be only the temporary
deprivation of property and its opportunity cost. Id.
328. It is not clear, however, what useful purpose secured money bail actually serves. Washington,
D.C. does not use money bail but relies instead on pretrial supervision. There, for Fiscal Year 2015,
ninety-one percent of defendants afforded liberty on recognizance remained arrest-free while their cases
were pending, and ninety percent made all scheduled court appearances. Performance Measures,
PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., https://www.psa.gov/?q-data/performancemeasures [https://
perma.cc/GNW4-4ME9] (last visited Dec. 28, 2018). A study by the Pretrial Justice Institute found
that releasing defendants subject to an unsecured bond that did not come due unless the defendant
failed to appear was equally effective at protecting public safety and ensuring defendants' court
appearances. MICHAEL R. JONES, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., UNSECURED BONDS: THE As EFFECTIVE
AND MOST EFFICIENT PRETRIAL RELEASE OPTION 10-11 (2013), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
5444/771 1f036e000af0fl77el76584b7aa7532f7.pdf.
329. Only about nineteen percent of defendants who have bail set at $500 or less can afford to pay it
at their arraignment. Robert Lewis, No Bail Money Keeps Poor People Behind Bars, WNYC NEWS
(Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.wnyc.org/story/bail-keeps-poor-people-behind-bars/ [https://perma.cc/
F4W6-7QY3]. In New York City in 2013, thirty-one percent of misdemeanants were incarcerated
because they could not afford $500 or less to make bail. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 168, at 32.
Commercial bail bonds are unavailable in low amounts, and the opportunity cost of the bond company's
take-typically ten percent-to an indigent criminal defendant is significant. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2,
at 40.
330. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
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merits, and defendants may introduce countervailing evidence.331 Requiring the
government to introduce evidence in criminal cases to demonstrate likelihood of
success on the merits-rather than merely proffers to demonstrate probable
cause3 3 2 -and affording defendants greater opportunity to refute the govem-
ment's case at that early stage could help avoid awarding interim relief to the
government to which it would not later be entitled on the merits.
When preliminary injunctions arise in disputed factual contexts,333 courts con-
sider evidence from both sides to resolve disputes over factors including likeli-
hood of success on the merits. For instance, in the California same-sex marriage
litigation, the plaintiffs filed declarations recounting their own experiences and
the importance of marriage to them, and the Defendant-Intervenors countered
with scholarly publications regarding the effects of marriage on children.334
Similarly, criminal defendants should be able to rebut the likelihood of success
on the merits with countervailing evidence at the Gerstein hearing or a prelimi-
nary hearing, at least to the extent feasible at this early stage of the process.335
Rendering the defendant's hearing testimony inadmissible in future proceedings
would encourage more defendants to avail themselves of this opportunity.336
As in civil procedure, awarding interim relief in the form of pretrial detention
skews the merits outcome-indeed, seemingly more so in criminal law.337
Interim relief in criminal law should therefore similarly not be awarded unless
the government can satisfy a robust inquiry into likelihood of success judged on
evidentiary submissions.33 8
The experience of defendants who choose to testify before New York grand
juries suggests that an early opportunity to contest the government's charges can
331. E.g., supra Section II.A.2.
332. See supra Section II.A.1 (explaining the current process for pretrial detention hearings).
333. See, e.g., Winter, 555 U.S. at 14 (recounting the factual dispute).
334. See Plaintiffs' Notice of Motion and Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Attachments 1-4, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292-VRW), ECF Nos. 7-1 to 7-4;
Proposed Intervenors' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Exhibits D & F,
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, ECF Nos. 36-4 & 36-6.
335. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1521, 1547
(1981) (proposing more robust preliminary hearings).
336. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE, supra note 89, § 10-5.10(d),
at 23 ("The testimony of a defendant [at a pretrial detention hearing] should not be admissible in any
other criminal proceedings against the defendant in the case in chief, other than a prosecution for perjury
based upon that testimony or for the purpose of impeachment in any subsequent proceedings."); see also
Colbert et al., supra note 81, at 1773 n.181 (collecting cases demonstrating a divide of authority
regarding whether an unrepresented efendant's statement during a bail hearing is later admissible).
337. See, e.g., Gouldin, supra note 14, at 860; Mayson, supra note 13, at 556; Simonson, supra note
1, at 595; see also Frontline: The Plea, supra note 275 (explaining the pressure on innocent detained
defendants to plead guilty when their sentence would result in immediate release).
338. As a practical matter, pretrial detention serves as an advance on the sentence the government
seeks after trial because defendants receive credit for p etrial detention against the ultimate sentence.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2012). That too is a reason for requiring likelihood of success on the
merits in pretrial detention.
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be valuable.339 Some New York defendants choose to testify even though such
testimony necessarily reveals important case strategy and risks retaliation from
the prosecutor in the form of less favorable plea offers.3 40 Defendants against
whom the government has a marginal case are the ones most likely to testify, and
they are precisely the sort of defendants who we should most want to testify so
that they may avoid facing added pressure to plead guilty. Defendants against
whom the government has a strong case would be far less likely to avail them-
selves of the opportunity to introduce evidence early; this proposal therefore need
not result in additional process in every case.34 1
The likelihood of success inquiry need not be wrapped up with balancing the
equities in detention against pretrial liberty. Indeed, it would be better if it
weren't. The comparison to preliminary injunctions suggests only that the likeli-
hood of success inquiry should be determined based on evidence and should pre-
cede a decision to detain a defendant. Judging likelihood of success during a
Gerstein hearing or preliminary hearing may make judges less likely to over-
weigh likelihood of success as a reason to detain defendants when interest balanc-
ing does not support that outcome. The suggestion here would raise the
government's existing burden of proving probable cause at a Gerstein or prelimi-
nary hearing to instead require proof of likelihood of success on the merits rather
than merely probable cause.342
To make defendants' responses as effective as possible, criminal systems
should afford defendants early discovery as New Jersey recently did.3 43 Allowing
early discovery comes at a cost of at least some prosecutor time (even if only to
copy the file) and likely some additional court time if defendants have more evi-
dence to present.344 But the benefits of defendants making decisions about their
339. See Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the
Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 23 & n.102 (2002); see also id. at 23 n.103 (collecting
citations to other jurisdictions that allow the defendant o testify before a grand jury).
340. Id. at 37-38.
341. See also 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 126, § 14.4(d), at 358 ("The conventional wisdom frowns
upon defense presentation of its own witnesses at a preliminary hearing absent most unusual
circumstances" because "the defense anticipates a bindover").
342. Increasing the court's focus on the merits of the case at an early stage runs in some tension with
the presumption of innocence. See Baradaran, supra note 27, at 731 (arguing that courts were not
historically permitted to consider the merits of the case before trial because such an approach would
violate the presumption of innocence). It seems quite fair to say that treating likelihood of success as
sufficient to detain a defendant would violate the presumption of innocence. But it is less convincing to
say the same of treating likelihood as a necessary condition such that its absence can help defendants
secure pretrial liberty. And the Supreme Court has been unwilling to put teeth into the presumption of
innocence aside from the burden of proof at trial. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (tying
the presumption of innocence to the burden of proof in criminal trials and explaining that "it has no
application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has
even begun").
343. See N.J. CT. R. 3:4-2(c)(2) (West 2018) (requiring the prosecutor to provide discovery at least
twenty-four hours before a pretrial detention hearing including all exculpatory evidence).
344. The history of the New Jersey rule suggests as much; the court struck a compromise to avoid




liberty and having a chance to contest the charges with a clearer picture of the evi-
dence against them are significant.34 5
The civil procedure literature recognizes that assessing likelihood of success
on the merits at an early stage requires the court to rely on an incomplete factual
record.346 Yet that incomplete record does not stop courts from considering the
merits in the preliminary injunction context.347 And in the criminal context, the
government has coercive evidence-gathering ability that civil plaintiffs lack.
Thus, the government should be able to put a more complete factual record before
the court than do civil plaintiffs.
Conceiving of likelihood of success as a prerequisite to pretrial detention offers
judges an intermediate remedy short of the simple binary choice between dis-
missing the charges for failure to state a crime and keeping the defendant
detained until trial. Because outright dismissal seems like such a heavy cost to the
government, courts hesitate to do that.348 Conceiving of pretrial liberty as an in-
termediate remedy less extreme than dismissal may make judges more likely to
afford some remedy than none34 9 in a criminal process without meaningful oppor-
350tunities for innocent defendants to escape the system.
The presumption of innocence marks an important difference between the civil
and criminal systems that affects how judges should account for likelihood of
success on the merits when deciding whether to detain a defendant pretrial. In all
circuits, the plaintiff must make a sufficient showing on all four prongs of the test
to obtain a preliminary injunction: likelihood of irreparable harm, that the balance
of equities favors her, likelihood of success on the merits, and that an injunction
favors the public interest. But once a plaintiff makes a sufficient showing on
each, some circuits allow a strong showing on the balance of equities to overcome
a weaker showing regarding likelihood of success on the merits. 3 51 The Fourth
Circuit, by contrast, requires the plaintiff to make "a clear showing" both that she
345. See Gold, Hessick & Hessick, supra note 39, at 1645-48 (arguing for greater discovery in part
to allow defendants to make more informed decisions); see also Baer, supra note 92, at 38 (explaining
why "the disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence is more costly to the prosecutor during
later stages of a case than it is during earlier stages of a case"). See generally Meyn, supra note 41
(explaining discrepancies between civil and criminal discovery).
346. E.g., Leubsdorf, supra note 31, at 532; Lynch, supra note 66, at 779.
347. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (requiring courts to evaluate
the likelihood of success on the merits before granting a preliminary injunction).
348. See Gold, Hessick & Hessick, supra note 39, at 1641 (explaining that "although judges have the
authority to dismiss an indictment for failure to state a crime, they almost never do so"); see also James
M. Burnham, Why Don't Courts Dismiss Indictments?, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 347, 356 & nn.24-26 (2015)
(collecting cases that uphold indictments because they track statutory language).
349. Cf. Andrew Blair-Stanek, Tax in the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Tax, 99
VA. L. REV. 1169, 1200-03 (2013) (explaining in the tax context that he IRS almost never escinds tax-
exempt status because that remedy is too draconian).
350. See Gold, Hessick & Hessick, supra note 39, at 1639-52.
351. See, e.g., All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011)
(explaining the continuing validity of a sliding-scale test after Winter); see also Sibley & Caulder, supra
note 191, at 10399 (same); Bates, supra note 191, at 1523 (detailing a circuit split on the continuing
validity of such a test).
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is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent interim relief and that she is likely to
succeed on the merits at trial; the scale does not slide between these prongs.352
In the criminal context, it makes sense to allow a strong showing on the bal-
ance of hardships to excuse a somewhat lesser showing on likelihood of success
so that the most dangerous defendants are detained pretrial. But that is the extent
to which the scale should slide. Allowing a strong showing of likelihood of suc-
cess to make up for weaker showings on the other prongs would mean detaining a
defendant whose pretrial liberty affords more benefit than cost and runs in tension
with the presumption of innocence. Such an approach would allow a preliminary
assessment of guilt to be the but-for cause of incarceration in some cases.353
Similar cost-benefit analysis would help judges regulate whether to afford defend-
ants pretrial liberty subject to conditions such as electronic monitoring. Electronic
monitoring is not costless to a defendant or to the public, but its cost is far lower
than incarceration.354 The harms from electronic monitoring or other forms of non-
carceral pretrial restraint for defendants would need to be better understood through
detailed qualitative research to refine exactly when each would be justified by its off-
setting benefits. In sum, judges should impose electronic monitoring somewhat hesi-
tantly but should consider whether this less costly alternative to custodial detention
would sufficiently achieve the government's objectives.
Some might expect judges to detain similar numbers of people before trial
with or without this proposal because judges are risk averse or simply dislike
criminal defendants. Some supporting evidence for that concern arises insofar
as judges in some jurisdictions cannot statutorily or constitutionally set unaf-
fordable bail as a backdoor to pretrial detention.35 5 And yet judges do so
352. United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 533 (4th Cir. 2013).
353. This approach resembles the Ninth Circuit's slightly sliding scale for preliminary injunctions in
WildRockies, 632 F.3d at 1131, 1134-35.
354. See Brian K. Payne & Randy R. Gainey, The Electronic Monitoring of Offenders Released from
Jail or Prison: Safety, Control, and Comparisons to the Incarceration Experience, 84 PRISON J. 413,
420-30 (2004) (explaining perceptions regarding differences between incarceration and electronic
monitoring); NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC MONITORING REDUCES
RECIDIVISM 1-2 (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/234460.pdf (reporting that monitored
defendants believed that monitoring stigmatized them, negatively affected their children because it
provided a constant reminder of potential incarceration, and made employment more difficult);
Wiseman, supra note 249, at 1364-82 (arguing for electronic monitoring as a lesser form of pretrial
restraint than incarceration); Yang, supra note 27, at 1480-83 (explaining that electronic monitoring
seems to hold promise as better balancing costs and benefits in some cases than incarceration, in part
because the cost of monitoring a defendant is much lower than detaining that defendant).
355. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (2012) ("The judicial officer may not impose a financial
condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person."); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13 ("A person who
is not detainable on grounds of dangerousness nor a flight risk in the absence of bond and is otherwise
eligible for bail shall not be detained solely because of financial inability to post a money or property
bond."); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(3)-(4) (2012) (providing pretrial release or unsecured bond as
the default positions for defendants who pose low or moderate risks of flight, nonappearance, or danger
to others, perhaps subject to monitoring for those in the moderate-risk category); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 15A-534(b) (2017) (providing that judges should release a defendant on recognizance, unsecured
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anyway.3 56 Risk-averse judges-especially those who must stand for
election3 57-do not want to bear the risk of releasing a defendant who then
commits a heinous crime.3 58
New Jersey gives reason to think that despite risk aversion judges might indeed
reduce the pretrial detainee population if urged to focus on deciding whether
there was good reason to detain a defendant rather than reflexively setting bail
that many defendants cannot afford. Since New Jersey eliminated money bail and
left judges to choose between detaining and releasing defendants, its jail popula-
tion has dropped significantly.35 9 By contrast, in Prince George's County,
Maryland, reforms meant o limit money bail have indeed done so in their first
year but have concomitantly increased the number of defendants detained without
bail.360 Those early results indicate that when pretrial detention hearings last only
a matter of minutes and pretrial services are underresourced, as in Prince
George's County, courts cannot support additional pretrial liberty on recogni-
zance or subject to monitoring.361 The empirical evidence in New Mexico is
bond, or to a particular individual absent a finding of reason to do otherwise); see also Widgery, supra
note 164 (charting important features of each state's statutory scheme on setting pretrial release
conditions in 2015).
356. See Gouldin, supra note 14, at 862 ("[J]udges continue to set unpayable bail figures to manage
perceived public safety risks."); cf. Dewan, supra note 26 (.'The bail is really being set to keep the
person in custody. You have to kind of concede that,' said a California judge, W. Kent Hamlin of
Superior Court in Fresno County.").
357. See, e.g., Gouldin, supra note 14, at 889 (noting that judges' tendencies to overdetain
defendants may be even stronger for elected judges).
358. See, e.g., id. ("Judges who perceive that they bear sole personal responsibility for a detention
decision will deliberately err on the side of over-detention. When judges allow liberty for potentially
dangerous individuals who subsequently inflict harm, 'the error will be emblazoned across the front
pages,' but when 'a judge detains an individual who would not have committed any wrong had he been
released, that error is invisible-and, indeed, unknowable."' (footnote omitted) (quoting Cole, supra
note 219, at 696)); Wiseman, supra note 17, at 417 ("Judges receive little to no recognition for releasing
defendants who pose little threat of flight or violence and are subject to few penalties for detaining them.
Yet they, unlike legislators, face the possibility of public scorn (and for elected judges, lost votes) for
releasing defendants who flee or commit crimes."); Wiltz, supra note 4 (quoting a Minnesota judge:
"The fear is I'm going to let somebody go and they're going to go out and do something terrible, or they
won't come back, so I'll set bail").
359. CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM INFO. CTR., N.J. COURTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM STATISTICS: JAN.
1 - Nov. 30, 2018, at Chart C: Nonsentenced Pretrial Jail Population (2018), https://www.njcourts.gov/
courts/assets/criminal/cjrreport20l8.pdfcachelD=UIMqLi6 [https://perma.cc/FMR7-FL2F] (reporting a 29.
5% decrease in the New Jersey state jail pretrial detainee population from January 1, 2017-when money
bail was eliminated-to November 30,2018).
360. PROGRESSIVE MD. & COLOR OF CHANGE, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY: A STUDY OF BAIL 4
(2018), https://static.colorofchange.org/static/v3/pg-report.pdfakid=14740.3112990.hZo0eM&rd=1&
t=8 [https://perma.cc/HG3Z-EYTK].
361. Id. at 13 (describing bail hearings in Prince George's County as "profoundly lacking in procedural
protections," evidenced in part by their "rapid pace," with "most lasting no more than five minutes, and some
concluding within one minute"); Lynh Bui, Reforms Intended to End Excessive Cash Bail in Md. Are
Keeping More in Jail Longer, Report Says, WASH. POST (July 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/public-safety/reforms-intended-to-end-excessive-cash-bail-in-md-are-keeping-more-in-jail-longer-
report-says/2018/07/02/bb97b306-731d-i1e8-b4b7-308400242c2e-story.html [https://perma.cc/53F3-
JNWZ] (recounting the acting district public defender's explanation of these results as due in part to
inadequate resources for pretrial services).
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unclear, but the former Governor complained that the reforms release too many
arrestees.362
Any procedural change that tends to favor criminal defendants runs the risk of
becoming merely a bargaining chip in a criminal system where prosecutors basi-
cally hold all the cards vis-a-vis the defendant.363 So it is conceivable that prose-
cutors could use their leverage over defendants to prod defendants into declining
to contest pretrial detention. But because pretrial detention is so costly and its
burdens so immediately felt, it seems unlikely that defendants will take that offer
except when the payoff is substantial.364 When the payoff is substantial, allowing
the defendant to trade time incarcerated now to save more time incarcerated later
makes sense even if defendants may sometimes do so irrationally.
That the pretrial detention regime suggested here is modeled on the prelimi-
nary injunction inquiry with which judges are already quite familiar should make
judges at least somewhat more likely to employ it. And indeed, some judges are
quite aware of the problems with the bail systems now in place. In Chicago, for
instance, the recent move to abandon money bail as a backdoor to detaining
defendants came from the Chief Judge.365 It was federal judges who preliminarily
enjoined the Houston bail system as unconstitutional.366 Thus, there is reason to
hope that judges might be willing to adopt a pretrial detention analysis that looks
much more like the one they use in the preliminary injunction context than does
the status quo for pretrial detention.
CONCLUSION
For a civil plaintiff it is quite difficult to obtain what she seeks before trial via
preliminary injunction. Criminal law, by contrast, unflinchingly provides the gov-
ernment in most cases with the relief that it seeks before trial: caging the accused.
This disparity is unjustifiable. It is troubling that people can lose their liberty
without having been convicted of a crime more easily than a corporation can be
ordered to stop doing some activity until the court can figure out who is right.
That criminal law does not provide those protections suggests that the criminal
system does not meaningfully presume defendants innocent nor does it actually
prefer 100 guilty people freed to one innocent jailed.
362. E.g., McKay & Shepard, supra note 306.
363. See, e.g., Gold, Hessick & Hessick, supra note 39, at 1652-54 (discussing whether prosecutors'
leverage over defendants could result in defendants waiving the procedural changes the article
proposes).
364. Some people, however, might prefer to immediately bear the cost of incarceration rather than be
afforded pretrial liberty and dread bearing that cost later. Cf. JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R.
STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUIVIAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION,
LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING 96 (2012) (discussing cognitive biases regarding delaying losses
and gains).
365. See Oppel, supra note 22 (discussing the order issued by the chief judge of the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois); see also General Order No. 18.8a, supra note 22.
366. ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 157, 166-67 (5th Cir. 2018), affg 251 F. Supp. 3d
1052, 1107 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
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Pretrial detention is in great flux across the country-in Congress, state legisla-
tures, city councils, and courts. This Article fundamentally re-envisions pretrial
detention law to more closely resemble preliminary injunction law. Such an
approach would first require the government to demonstrate likelihood of irrepa-
rable injury from pretrial liberty such as the defendant committing a violent crime
against an identifiable victim or the defendant absconding from the jurisdiction.
Second, it would depart from the current one-sided analysis and examine how in-
terim restraint of defendants would harm the defendant, her loved ones, and non-
parties. That inquiry would require judges to explicitly analyze how detention
would harm each defendant in ways specific to that defendant-such as loss of
employment, custody of a child, or housing-or in ways that any defendant
would be harmed. Third, it would require the government to introduce evidence
to demonstrate its likelihood of success on the merits and allow defendants dis-
covery and opportunity to refute that showing. Such an approach would better
recognize the extraordinary nature of affording one side the relief that it seeks
before judgment. It would recognize that pretrial detention severely harms
defendants, their families, and their communities. And it would force accused
defendants who are presumed innocent to bear these massive costs only when the
benefits of detention outweigh its costs.
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APPENDIX - PRETRIAL DETENTION CHECKLIST
Has the government demonstrated that releasing the defendant would likely
cause irreparable injury?
O How significant of a threat does the defendant pose to others if allowed
pretrial liberty? (Account here for seriousness of the accusations.)
L Is the defendant likely to be convicted of another serious crime while on
pretrial liberty?
O How likely is the defendant to flee the jurisdiction?
How significantly would pretrial detention harm the defendant and others?
O Does the defendant face a serious risk of losing custody of a child if
detained?
O Does the defendant face a serious risk of losing housing if detained?
H Does the defendant face a serious risk of losing employment if detained?
H Has the court articulated and considered that detaining a defendant
increases the pressure for her to plead guilty?
H Has the court articulated and considered that defendants detained pretrial
have greater likelihood of conviction and serve longer sentences?
H How would detaining the defendant affect nonparties such as the defend-
ant's loved ones?
H How would granting the defendant liberty affect nonparties such as
victims?
Are the risks of granting the defendant liberty sufficient to outweigh these
costs?
H Would a lesser restraint such as pretrial liberty on conditions better bal-
ance the benefits of restraint with its costs than would detention?
Has the government demonstrated with evidence that it is likely to succeed
on the merits?
H Has the defendant been afforded discovery and an opportunity to refute
the government's likelihood of success on the merits?
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